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Introduction	  	   The	  German	  nation	  went	  through	  momentous	  change	  in	  the	  twentieth	  century.	  	  The	  first	  two	  decades	  saw	  a	  country	  whose	  populace	  believed	  in	  the	  
Sonderweg,	  the	  “special	  path”	  that	  Germany	  would	  take	  to	  glory—a	  path	  which	  was	  taken	  through	  military	  might	  and	  conquest.	  	  Germany’s	  defeat	  in	  the	  First	  World	  War	  did	  little	  to	  change	  the	  minds	  of	  the	  people,	  who	  had	  lived	  through	  German	  exceptionalism	  since	  German	  unification	  in	  1871.	  	  The	  National	  Socialists	  seized	  the	  opportunity	  to	  blame	  Germany’s	  loss	  in	  the	  war	  on	  the	  many	  minority	  groups:	  Jews,	  Catholics,	  Poles	  and	  other	  Slavs,	  to	  name	  a	  few.	  	  The	  German	  nation	  was	  not	  just	  militaristic,	  but	  racist	  as	  well:	  	  a	  true	  German	  had	  to	  be	  of	  Aryan	  stock.	  	  The	  Germans	  were	  rabidly	  patriotic;	  the	  national	  symbol,	  the	  swastika,	  adorned	  flags	  and	  public	  buildings	  across	  the	  nation.	  	   	  The	  horrors	  of	  war	  changed	  the	  minds	  of	  the	  Germans.	  	  As	  the	  country	  lay	  in	  ruins	  following	  a	  second	  defeat,	  many	  felt	  lost.	  	  The	  state	  was	  abolished;	  there	  was	  no	  Germany	  to	  belong	  to,	  no	  military	  to	  admire,	  no	  flag	  to	  fly.	  	  Without	  the	  Reich,	  how	  would	  Germany	  develop	  a	  new	  state?	  	  Would	  it	  be	  the	  same	  as	  the	  old	  one?	  	  Would	  Germans	  resent	  the	  victorious	  allies?	  	  Would	  they	  want	  to	  democratize?	  	  This	  thesis	  paper	  will	  explore	  the	  development	  of	  German	  nationhood	  from	  the	  defeat	  of	  the	  Third	  Reich	  in	  1945	  to	  today.	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Chapter	  1	  –	  The	  Nation	  in	  the	  Immediate	  Aftermath	  of	  the	  Second	  World	  War	  
	  
Humiliation	  
The	  end	  of	  National	  Socialist	  German	  nationalism	  began	  with	  the	  capitulation	  of	  the	  Third	  Reich	  on	  May	  8,	  1945.1	  	  In	  signing	  the	  instrument	  of	  capitulation,	  General	  Alfred	  Jodl	  admitted	  to	  the	  world,	  and	  to	  Germany,	  that	  the	  mighty	  Third	  Reich	  had	  been	  completely	  defeated.2	  	  The	  fact	  that	  the	  German	  nation	  was	  forced	  to	  surrender	  unconditionally	  to	  the	  Allies	  meant	  that	  its	  fate	  was	  no	  longer	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  German	  people.	  	  A	  once	  proud	  nation	  had	  been	  humbled.	  
In	  the	  text	  of	  the	  1945	  Yalta	  Agreement,	  the	  allies	  had	  agreed	  to	  	  
destroy	  German	  militarism	  and	  Nazism	  and	  to	  ensure	  that	  Germany	  will	  never	  again	  be	  able	  to	  disturb	  the	  peace	  of	  the	  world	  .	  .	  .	  disband	  all	  German	  armed	  forces;	  break	  up	  for	  all	  time	  the	  German	  General	  Staff	  that	  has	  repeatedly	  contrived	  the	  resurgence	  of	  German	  militarism;	  remove	  or	  destroy	  all	  German	  military	  equipment;	  eliminate	  or	  control	  all	  German	  industry	  that	  could	  be	  used	  for	  military	  production.3	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Konrad	  H.	  Jarausch,	  After	  Hitler:	  	  Recivilizing	  Germans,	  1945-­‐1995,	  transl.	  Brandon	  Hunziker.	  (New	  York:	  	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2006),	  25.	  2	  Ibid.	  3	  “The	  Yalta	  Agreement”	  in	  Landmark	  Document	  in	  American	  History;	  The	  Public	  Papers	  and	  AGDResses	  of	  Franklin	  D.	  Roosevelt,	  1944-­‐45,	  Vol.,	  Victory	  and	  the	  Threshold	  of	  Peace,	  p.	  531-­‐537,	  Accessed	  online	  at	  http://coursesa.matrix.msu.edu/~hst306/documents/YALTA.html	  (Last	  accessed	  November	  30,	  2014.)	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The	  reasoning	  behind	  the	  demobilization	  of	  the	  Wehrmacht	  was	  more	  than	  just	  a	  desire	  to	  see	  Germany	  militarily	  weakened.	  	  The	  allies	  wanted	  to	  remove	  the	  German	  political,	  economic,	  and	  social	  ties	  to	  the	  military	  that	  had	  been	  so	  strong	  during	  and	  before	  the	  Nazi	  era.4	  	  According	  to	  a	  1937	  book	  by	  Alfred	  Vagts,	  Germans	  “[carried]	  military	  mentality	  and	  modes	  of	  action	  and	  decision	  into	  the	  civilian	  sphere.”5	  	  For	  a	  German	  nation	  that	  depended	  so	  heavily	  on	  its	  military	  prowess	  as	  a	  source	  of	  identity	  and	  pride,	  the	  defeat	  in	  the	  war	  and	  subsequent	  dismantling	  of	  the	  
Wehrmacht	  was	  humiliating.	  
Destroying	  the	  very	  foundations	  of	  Nazi	  German	  national	  identity	  was	  thought	  to	  be	  paramount	  to	  the	  rehabilitation	  of	  Germany	  as	  a	  whole.	  	  The	  Third	  Reich,	  many	  argued,	  was	  a	  logical	  consequence	  of	  German	  traditions;	  for	  them	  the	  German	  Sonderweg	  ideal	  was	  incompatible	  with	  Democracy	  and	  could	  only	  lead	  to	  militaristic,	  fervent	  nationalism.6	  	  Indeed,	  even	  before	  National	  Socialism,	  the	  Junkers’	  “lust	  for	  war”	  had	  helped	  ignite	  the	  flames	  of	  World	  War	  I.7	  	  As	  Konrad	  Jarausch	  notes,	  in	  order	  to	  prevent	  the	  possibility	  of	  future	  aggression	  due	  to	  this	  “lust	  for	  war”,	  the	  allies	  wanted	  a	  “radical	  break	  with	  the	  traditions	  that	  had	  made	  Hitler’s	  tyranny	  and	  its	  untold	  atrocities	  possible.”8	  	  Thus	  these	  German	  traditions	  had	  to	  be	  eliminated,	  with	  the	  loss	  of	  many	  aspects	  of	  German	  national	  identity	  as	  collateral	  damage.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Jarausch,	  25-­‐26.	  5	  Ibid.,	  26.	  6	  For	  example,	  sociologist	  Ralf	  Dahrendorf;	  Ibid.,	  11.	  7	  Ibid.,	  26.	  8	  Ibid.,	  19.	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Dismantling	  the	  German	  State	  
	   Another	  component	  of	  the	  Yalta	  Agreement	  was	  the	  division	  of	  German	  lands	  between	  the	  allies,	  outlined	  in	  a	  section	  entitled	  “Dismemberment	  of	  Germany.”9	  	  According	  to	  the	  agreement,	  the	  United	  States,	  the	  United	  Kingdom,	  and	  the	  Soviet	  Union—France	  was	  added	  to	  the	  list	  of	  occupying	  forces	  under	  a	  separate	  provision—were	  to	  occupy	  because	  the	  occupation	  and	  dismemberment	  of	  Germany	  was	  “requisite	  for	  future	  peace	  and	  security.”10	  	  After	  the	  war,	  the	  Postdam	  Conference	  officially	  enacted	  many	  of	  the	  proposed	  sanctions	  on	  Germany	  from	  the	  earlier	  Yalta	  Agreement.	  	  In	  accordance	  with	  this	  agreement,	  Germans	  were	  to	  be	  punished	  so	  that	  they	  would	  be	  convinced	  “that	  they	  have	  suffered	  a	  total	  military	  defeat	  and	  that	  they	  cannot	  escape	  responsibility	  for	  what	  they	  have	  brought	  upon	  themselves,	  since	  their	  own	  ruthless	  warfare	  and	  the	  fanatical	  Nazi	  resistance	  have	  destroyed	  German	  economy	  and	  made	  chaos	  and	  suffering	  inevitable.”11	  	  The	  allied	  conference	  at	  Potsdam	  also	  provided	  for	  the	  acknowledgement	  of	  the	  Soviet-­‐backed	  Polish	  Provisional	  Government,	  the	  separation	  of	  Austria	  from	  Germany,	  and	  the	  Russian	  annexation	  of	  Königsberg	  and	  the	  surrounding	  countryside,	  all	  of	  which	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  “The	  Yalta	  Conference,”	  in	  A	  Decade	  of	  American	  Foriegn	  Policy:	  Basic	  Documents,	  
1941-­‐49,	  Staff	  of	  the	  Committee	  and	  the	  Department	  of	  State.	  (Washington,	  DC	  :	  Government	  Printing	  Office,	  1950),	  accessed	  online	  at	  http://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/yalta.asp	  (Last	  accessed	  November	  30,	  2014).	  10	  Ibid.	  11	  “Potsdam	  Conference,”	  in	  A	  Decade	  of	  American	  Foriegn	  Policy:	  Basic	  Documents,	  
1941-­‐49,	  Staff	  of	  the	  Committee	  and	  the	  Department	  of	  State.	  (Washington,	  DC	  :	  Government	  Printing	  Office,	  1950),	  accessed	  online	  at	  http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/decade17.asp	  (Last	  accessed	  November	  30,	  2014).	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greatly	  reduced	  German	  territories.12	  	  The	  subsequent	  agreement	  also	  called	  for	  Germany	  to	  pay	  reparations	  to	  the	  victims	  of	  the	  war	  and	  imposed	  allied	  sanctions	  and	  controls	  on	  many	  aspects	  of	  the	  German	  economy,	  particularly	  in	  the	  financial	  and	  industrial	  sectors,	  which	  crippled	  Germany’s	  commercial	  power.13	  	  The	  end	  goals	  of	  the	  allies	  were	  clear:	  	  abolish	  German	  statehood,	  occupy	  German	  lands	  for	  as	  long	  as	  necessary	  to	  ensure	  peace,	  and	  dismantle	  the	  German	  economic	  powerhouse.	  
For	  a	  people	  who	  had	  once	  held	  Deutschland	  über	  alles,	  the	  fact	  that	  there	  was	  no	  longer	  a	  Deutschland,	  and	  that	  the	  war	  ravaged	  land	  that	  remained	  was	  subjugated	  under	  the	  allied	  nations,	  completely	  destroyed	  any	  semblance	  of	  nationalism	  in	  the	  immediate	  aftermath	  of	  the	  war.	  	  The	  loss	  of	  this	  old	  national	  feeling	  created	  the	  necessity	  for	  a	  new	  one,	  and	  yet	  the	  guilt	  of	  the	  holocaust	  and	  the	  legacy	  of	  the	  virulent	  jingoism	  of	  the	  Nazis	  made	  the	  ensuing	  development	  of	  a	  new	  identity	  very	  uncomfortable	  for	  Germans,	  as	  it	  continues,	  to	  a	  certain	  extent,	  to	  do	  today.	  
	  
The	  Widening	  Divide	  
While	  all	  parties	  at	  the	  Potsdam	  Conference	  favored	  a	  temporary	  partition	  of	  Germany,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  initially	  neither	  the	  Western	  Allies	  nor	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  “Potsdam	  Conference.”	  13	  Ibid.	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Soviet	  Union	  originally	  intended	  for	  the	  territories	  to	  remain	  divided	  indefinitely.14	  	  At	  the	  Yalta,	  Tehran,	  and	  Potsdam,	  permanent	  division	  was	  rejected	  by	  the	  Western	  leaders	  as	  well	  as	  by	  Stalin.15	  	  Charles	  Maier	  notes,	  “the	  increasingly	  unbridgeable	  division	  came	  about	  only	  with	  the	  Cold	  War	  after	  the	  occupation	  began.”16	  	  The	  Soviets	  had	  originally	  envisioned	  a	  unified,	  but	  soviet-­‐sympathizing	  Germany,	  and	  would	  thus	  block	  any	  attempt	  at	  an	  anti-­‐communist	  alignment.17	  	  The	  Western	  allies,	  too,	  were	  looking	  to	  reunite	  Germany,	  but	  were	  wary	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union’s	  increasingly	  oppressive	  control	  of	  their	  sector.18	  	  	  
In	  1946,	  the	  Soviets	  began	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  single-­‐party	  state	  in	  their	  zone	  of	  control	  when	  the	  Sozialistische	  Einheitspartei	  Deutschland	  was	  formed	  by	  a	  forced	  merger	  between	  the	  German	  Communist	  Party	  and	  the	  Social	  Democrats.	  	  This	  confirmed	  the	  worst	  suspicions	  of	  the	  West:	  that	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  was	  attempting	  to	  establish	  a	  satellite	  state	  in	  its	  zone.	  	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  Anglo-­‐American	  allies	  rejected	  the	  Russian	  terms	  for	  a	  unified	  German	  state,	  and	  the	  once	  hoped-­‐for	  unification	  was	  placed	  on	  the	  backburner	  as	  the	  Cold	  War	  tensions	  flared.19	  	  	  
As	  the	  division	  of	  Germany	  became	  more	  solidified,	  the	  three	  Western	  zones	  were	  officially	  combined	  to	  form	  the	  new	  Bundesrepublik	  Deutschland	  on	  May	  29,	  1949.	  	  The	  Soviets	  followed	  suit	  with	  the	  Eastern	  zone	  in	  October,	  branding	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  Charles	  S.	  Maier,	  The	  Unmasterable	  Past:	  	  History,	  Holocaust,	  and	  German	  National	  
Identity,	  (Cambridge:	  	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  1988),	  20.	  15	  Maier,	  Unmasterable	  Past,	  20.	  16	  Ibid,	  21.	  17	  Charles	  S.	  Maier,	  Dissolution:	  	  The	  Crisis	  of	  Communism	  and	  the	  End	  of	  East	  
Germany,	  (Princeton:	  	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  1997),	  8.	  18	  Ibid.	  19	  For	  example,	  it	  was	  around	  this	  time	  that	  the	  Berlin	  Airlift	  was	  occurring;	  ibid.	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territory	  the	  Deutsche	  Demokratische	  Republik,	  and	  installing	  SED	  leader	  Wilhelm	  Pieck	  as	  the	  head	  of	  its	  government.20	  	  With	  the	  disappearance	  of	  a	  chance	  for	  a	  single	  German	  state,	  the	  chance	  for	  a	  single	  national	  identity	  was	  lost	  as	  well.	  	  The	  use	  of	  Germany	  as	  an	  “object	  of	  international	  politics”—to	  borrow	  a	  phrase	  from	  Jarausch—and	  the	  division	  of	  the	  country,	  robbed	  a	  singular	  German	  nationalism	  of	  its	  potency.21	  	  Instead,	  two	  distinct	  identities	  developed,	  mirroring	  the	  emergence	  of	  East	  and	  West	  Germany.	  
	  
Early	  National	  Identities	  
	   In	  West	  Germany,	  many	  began	  to	  question	  the	  nationalism	  behind	  the	  hellish	  violence	  that	  Nazism	  had	  wrought	  on	  Europe.22	  	  When	  the	  Nazi	  propaganda	  machine	  was	  removed,	  many	  began	  to	  realize	  that	  they	  had	  been	  “victims	  of	  an	  ideology	  of	  fatherland	  and	  greatness,	  authority	  and	  obedience,	  military	  strength	  and	  self-­‐sacrifice,	  contempt	  for	  mankind	  and	  racial	  madness.”23	  	  Some	  Germans	  tried	  to	  remove	  the	  racist	  aspect	  of	  their	  love	  of	  the	  fatherland,	  among	  them	  historian	  Walter	  Goetz.24	  	  A	  few	  Germans	  tried	  to	  escape	  the	  shame	  of	  their	  nation,	  but	  found	  that	  they	  were	  despised	  in	  the	  lands	  to	  which	  the	  emigrated.25	  	  However,	  most	  moved	  away	  from	  the	  adoration	  of	  the	  nation-­‐state	  as	  an	  entity,	  with	  some	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  Maier,	  Dissolution,	  12.	  21	  Jarausch,	  56.	  22	  Ibid.,	  58.	  23	  Ibid.	  24	  Ibid.,	  59.	  25	  Ibid.,	  59-­‐60.	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advocating	  for	  a	  unified	  Europe	  which	  could	  overcome	  the	  affliction	  of	  nationalism.26	  	  	  
	   In	  the	  allied-­‐controlled	  schools,	  there	  were	  many	  visible	  efforts	  to	  show	  Germans	  the	  destruction	  brought	  by	  the	  Nazis,	  in	  the	  hopes	  that	  they	  could	  learn	  from	  the	  experience.	  	  Students	  were	  exposed	  to	  texts	  about	  the	  holocaust,	  and	  watched,	  shocked,	  as	  films	  played	  about	  the	  liberation	  of	  concentration	  camps.27	  	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  educators	  also	  sought	  to	  introduce	  Germans	  to	  progressive	  thought,	  causing	  one	  student	  to	  remark	  “I	  didn’t	  know	  that	  a	  literature	  without	  a	  nationalistic	  pathos	  [even	  existed].”28	  	  The	  re-­‐education	  of	  young	  Germans	  helped	  foster	  the	  distrust	  and	  dislike	  of	  nationalism	  that	  the	  allies	  had	  envisioned.	  	  The	  Western	  influence	  with	  the	  youth	  also	  helped	  foster	  a	  love	  for	  Western	  culture;	  American	  movies	  and	  films	  were	  wildly	  popular	  in	  postwar	  Germany.	  
	   Despite	  this	  emergent	  aversion	  to	  nationalism,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  newfound	  infatuation	  with	  Western,	  particularly	  American,	  culture,	  West	  Germans	  were	  generally	  able	  to	  preserve	  a	  sense	  of	  identity	  that	  “transcended	  defeat.”29	  	  Given	  their	  collective	  suffering	  during	  and	  after	  the	  collapse	  of	  Nazi	  Germany,	  they	  found	  themselves	  identifying	  as	  the	  victims	  of	  “occupation,	  captivity,	  hunger,	  and	  cold.”30	  	  So	  strong	  was	  this	  German	  feeling,	  that	  border	  corrections	  proposed	  by	  the	  Netherlands,	  Belgium	  and	  Luxemburg	  in	  1945	  which	  could	  have	  resulted	  in	  some	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  Jarausch,	  59-­‐60.	  27	  Ibid.,	  57.	  28	  Ibid.,	  58.	  29	  Ibid,	  60.	  30	  Ibid.	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parts	  of	  the	  former	  Nazi	  lands	  being	  given	  to	  allies	  of	  the	  victors,	  resulted	  in	  overwhelming	  resistance	  from	  the	  Germans	  who	  lived	  there.31	  	  Even	  though	  the	  Germans	  were	  ashamed	  of	  and	  horrified	  by	  the	  unspeakable	  acts	  of	  their	  nation,	  they	  remained	  unwilling	  to	  break	  with	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  nation	  entirely,	  and	  thus	  continued	  to	  consider	  themselves	  German.	  
	   This	  feeling	  of	  German	  identity	  was	  further	  bolstered	  by	  the	  pride	  felt	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  success	  of	  the	  Germany	  economy,	  which	  was	  due	  in	  no	  small	  part	  to	  the	  Marshall	  Plan	  and	  the	  currency	  reform	  of	  1948.32	  	  The	  so-­‐called	  “Deutschmark	  Nationalism”	  was	  significant	  in	  its	  lack	  of	  attachment	  to	  any	  ideology,	  but	  also	  hearkened	  back	  to	  older	  national	  stereotypes	  of	  craftsmanship	  and	  trade.33	  	  Also	  wholly	  unideological	  was	  the	  German	  pride	  after	  the	  victory	  in	  the	  1954	  World	  Cup,	  held	  in	  Switzerland.34	  	  For	  many,	  seeing	  Germany	  succeed	  in	  competition	  with	  other	  nations	  was	  a	  welcome	  change.	  
	   As	  the	  only	  democratically	  elected	  German	  government,	  the	  Federal	  Republic	  considered	  itself	  the	  successor	  to	  the	  German	  Reich.	  	  Indeed,	  the	  preamble	  to	  the	  Grundgesetz	  stated	  that	  “the	  entire	  German	  people	  are	  called	  on	  to	  achieve	  in	  self-­‐determination	  the	  unity	  and	  freedom	  of	  Germany.”35	  
	   In	  East	  Germany,	  the	  movement	  away	  from	  nationalism	  was	  less	  pronounced,	  and	  in	  certain	  aspects,	  nonexistent.	  	  For	  instance,	  the	  old	  nationalist	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31	  Jarausch,	  61.	  32	  Ibid,	  65.	  33	  Ibid.	  34	  Ibid.,	  64.	  35	  Ibid.,	  62.	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propaganda	  of	  the	  Nazis	  made	  way	  for	  the	  new	  propaganda	  of	  the	  Soviets,	  though	  this	  was	  met	  with	  “defiance	  and	  rejection.”36	  	  Marxist	  intellectuals,	  such	  as	  journalist	  Alexander	  Abusch,	  contended	  that	  German	  nationalism	  had	  been	  corrupted	  by	  the	  reactionary	  National	  Socialist	  elites,	  and	  had	  driven	  the	  nation	  down	  “a	  suicidal	  path,”	  but	  was	  not	  in	  and	  of	  itself	  a	  bad	  thing.37	  	  Some	  took	  this	  a	  step	  further,	  using	  the	  past	  crimes	  of	  fascism	  to	  justify	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  communist	  state.38	  	  Furthermore,	  while	  not	  as	  strong	  as	  the	  Wirtschaftswunder	  in	  the	  West,	  the	  East,	  too,	  experienced	  a	  sizeable	  economic	  growth,	  which	  led	  to	  the	  pervasiveness	  of	  the	  sentiment	  of	  “We	  are	  back!”39	  
	   Like	  the	  Federal	  Republic,	  the	  GDR	  also	  claimed	  to	  represent	  the	  entire	  German	  nation,	  as	  affirmed	  in	  its	  constitution:	  “Germany	  is	  an	  indivisible	  democratic	  republic	  that	  consists	  of	  the	  German	  states.”40	  	  The	  SED’s	  official	  party	  platform	  claimed	  that	  “the	  unity	  of	  the	  working	  class	  is	  the	  unity	  of	  Germany.”41	  	  In	  other	  words,	  a	  united	  Germany	  was	  tantamount	  to	  the	  proletarian	  revolution.	  
	  
Conclusion	  to	  Chapter	  1	  
	   In	  both	  the	  East	  and	  the	  West,	  Germans	  paradoxically	  continued	  to	  hold	  onto	  semblances	  of	  their	  nationhood,	  though	  they	  no	  longer	  associated	  with	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  36	  Jarausch,	  57.	  37	  Ibid,	  59.	  38	  Ibid.,	  65.	  39	  Ibid.,	  65.	  40	  Ibid.,	  62.	  41	  Ibid.,	  61.	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nationalism	  of	  the	  Third	  Reich.	  	  The	  horrors	  of	  the	  holocaust	  and	  the	  war	  caused	  by	  this	  rabid,	  racist	  nationalism	  caused	  the	  German	  people	  to	  look	  at	  nationalism	  in	  a	  new	  light.	  	  Jarausch	  notes	  “out	  of	  the	  reality	  of	  a	  deeply	  troubled	  self-­‐consciousness,	  they	  thus	  made	  a	  virtue	  of	  post-­‐nationality,	  arguing	  that,	  similar	  to	  the	  other	  ‘post’-­‐concepts,	  Germans	  had	  survived	  the	  malady	  of	  nationalism	  and	  had	  learned	  from	  it.”42	  	  Thus	  Germans	  moved	  towards	  an	  entirely	  unideological	  definition	  of	  “Germanness.”	  	  However,	  this	  post-­‐nationalist	  movement	  would	  be	  somewhat	  diluted	  in	  the	  adversarial	  nature	  of	  the	  impending	  Cold	  War.	  
	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  42	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Chapter	  2	  –	  Differences	  in	  Nationalism	  and	  Nationhood	  from	  the	  early	  1950s	  
until	  the	  introduction	  of	  Ostpolitik	  
	  
Developing	  Modern	  Nations	  
	   As	  the	  Cold	  War	  evolved	  into	  a	  more	  strictly	  defined	  struggle	  between	  the	  Western	  Powers	  and	  the	  Eastern	  Bloc,	  so	  too	  did	  the	  identities	  of	  West	  and	  East	  Germany	  evolve	  into	  more	  strictly	  defined	  versions	  of	  themselves.	  	  With	  the	  
Hallstein	  Doktrin,	  West	  Germany	  declared	  officially	  that	  it	  did	  not	  acknowledge	  the	  GDR,	  and	  that	  the	  Federal	  Republic	  would	  consider	  it	  an	  unfriendly	  act	  for	  another	  nation	  to	  establish	  relations	  with	  the	  GDR.43	  	  Additionally,	  it	  asserted	  that	  any	  reunification	  negotiations	  would	  have	  to	  be	  based	  on	  the	  1937	  borders	  of	  Germany,	  including	  much	  of	  the	  territory	  that	  was	  now	  part	  of	  Poland.44	  	  Though	  it	  is	  unlikely	  that	  Russia	  would	  have	  allowed	  Germany	  to	  reunite	  under	  any	  circumstances,	  these	  terms	  were	  denounced	  as	  unacceptable,	  thus	  effectively	  ending	  any	  chance	  for	  immediate	  reunification.	  	  With	  the	  prospect	  of	  (at	  least	  semi-­‐permanent)	  separate	  Germanies,	  the	  Western	  Allies	  and	  the	  Russians	  began	  modernizing	  the	  states	  which	  they	  supported	  in	  their	  own	  image.	  
In	  the	  Federal	  Republic,	  the	  Western	  Allies	  continued	  with	  the	  western	  view	  of	  “modernization,”	  encouraging	  free	  market	  economic	  policies,	  and	  allowing	  the	  West	  German	  people	  to	  operate	  a	  democratic	  government.	  	  With	  the	  1955	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  43	  Joost	  Kleuters,	  Reunification	  in	  West	  German	  Party	  Politics	  from	  Westbindung	  to	  Ostpolitik,	  (New	  York:	  Pallgrave	  Macmillan	  Publishers,	  2012.),	  72.	  44	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Westverträge,	  the	  Federal	  Republic	  was	  made	  a	  full	  member	  of	  the	  North	  Atlantic	  Treaty	  Organisation,	  signifying	  Chancellor	  Konrad	  Adenauer’s	  military	  alliance	  with	  the	  West.45	  	  	  Some	  were	  initially	  skeptical	  of	  the	  tremendous	  influence	  the	  occupying	  forces	  had	  over	  Germany,	  including	  one	  intellectual,	  who	  in	  1946	  complained	  “we	  will	  only	  truly	  experience	  our	  defeat	  if	  we	  let	  values	  and	  behavior	  be	  dictated	  to	  us	  by	  the	  victors	  instead	  of	  by	  our	  own	  traditions.”46	  	  	  
	   In	  the	  East,	  the	  Russians	  set	  about	  establishing	  their	  own	  version	  of	  a	  “modern”	  state,	  in	  direct	  contrast	  to	  the	  free	  West,	  but	  were	  faced	  with	  substantial	  opposition	  from	  the	  people.	  	  Many	  East	  Germans	  had	  bad	  memories	  of	  the	  atrocities	  committed	  by	  the	  Red	  Army,	  and	  were	  reluctant	  to	  cooperate	  with	  Russia.	  	  Some	  also	  resented	  the	  lack	  of	  free	  elections.	  	  Since	  the	  East	  Germans	  were	  somewhat	  unwilling	  to	  accept	  a	  communist	  state,	  the	  Russian-­‐backed	  GDR	  government	  used	  a	  vast	  array	  of	  repressive	  practices,	  including	  terror	  and	  propaganda,	  to	  guarantee	  cooperation.47	  	  
	   Some,	  both	  in	  the	  East	  and	  the	  West	  shared	  the	  sentiment	  that	  the	  Germans	  would	  lose	  their	  German-­‐ness	  to	  new	  identities	  formed	  by	  the	  new	  political	  ideologies	  being	  foisted	  upon	  them	  by	  Washington	  and	  Moscow.	  	  As	  Jarausch	  notes,	  “the	  Germans	  would	  need	  a	  long	  process	  of	  reorientation	  to	  resolve	  this	  contradiction	  between	  importing	  reforms	  while	  preserving	  their	  own	  identity.”48	  	  In	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  45	  Kleuters,	  2.	  46	  Jarausch,	  103.	  47	  Mary	  Fulbrook,	  	  History	  of	  Germany	  1918-­‐2000:	  	  The	  Divided	  Nation,	  (Malden:	  	  Blackwell	  Publishing	  Ltd,	  2002),	  153.	  48	  Jarausch,	  103.	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West	  Germany,	  the	  formation	  of	  a	  new,	  western	  German	  identity	  required	  removing	  the	  “deep-­‐seated	  anti-­‐Western	  prejudices”	  to	  which	  Germans	  had	  grown	  accustomed	  under	  the	  Nazi	  regime.49	  	  	  
One	  of	  the	  most	  important	  reasons	  why	  West	  Germans	  began	  to	  accept	  a	  more	  democratic	  identity	  was	  the	  personal,	  individual	  interactions	  between	  the	  occupying	  powers	  and	  the	  German	  people.50	  	  This	  began	  with	  the	  first	  arrival	  of	  occupying	  soldiers	  who	  “acted	  less	  violently	  than	  the	  dire	  warnings	  of	  Nazi	  propaganda	  led	  [Germans]	  to	  expect,”	  and	  showed	  the	  defeated	  people	  that	  “it	  just	  might	  be	  possible	  to	  get	  along	  with	  the	  occupiers.”51	  	  American	  soldiers	  famously	  won	  over	  German	  civilians’	  hearts	  and	  minds	  with	  gifts	  of	  chocolate	  bars,	  coffee	  and	  cigarettes.52	  	  The	  soldiers	  made	  a	  concerted	  effort	  to	  be	  a	  part	  of	  the	  communities	  they	  oversaw	  by	  allowing	  German	  people	  to	  tour	  their	  bases	  and	  establishing	  youth	  clubs	  which	  organized	  activities	  for	  German	  children	  (and	  exposed	  them	  to	  Coca-­‐Cola	  and	  Hershey’s	  chocolate).53	  	  Furthermore,	  unlike	  the	  Russian	  soldiers	  in	  the	  East,	  who	  lived	  shut	  away	  in	  their	  barracks,	  the	  Americans	  were	  afforded	  the	  option	  of	  living	  off-­‐base,	  which	  Jarausch	  notes	  “extended	  the	  area	  of	  contact	  between	  GI	  renters	  and	  German	  landlords.”54	  
	   Perhaps	  most	  importantly,	  during	  the	  late	  1940s	  and	  early	  1950s,	  an	  exchange	  program	  was	  created	  to	  allow	  German	  students	  and	  professors	  to	  study	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  49	  Jarausch,	  104.	  50	  Ibid.,	  105.	  51	  Ibid.,	  105.	  52	  Ibid.,	  107.	  53	  Ibid.,	  108.	  54	  Ibid.,	  108.	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and	  teach	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  	  By	  1955	  over	  12,000	  Germans	  had	  studied	  in	  America,	  including	  future	  influential	  figures	  such	  as	  Walter	  Hallstein	  who	  lectured	  at	  Georgetown.55	  	  These	  students	  and	  teachers	  were	  greeted	  with	  a	  “very	  warm	  reception”	  which	  helped	  them	  forget	  past	  prejudices.56	  	  Many	  more	  Germans	  who	  travelled	  to	  America	  came	  back	  with	  knowledge	  of	  how	  a	  free	  and	  democratic	  society	  operated,	  including	  intellectual,	  journalist,	  and	  future	  chancellor	  Willy	  Brandt.57	  
By	  contrast,	  the	  Gruppe	  Ulbricht,	  a	  group	  of	  German	  Stalinists	  led	  by	  Walter	  Ulbricht	  who	  had	  been	  in	  exile	  in	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  during	  the	  war,	  suffered	  Stalinist	  persecution	  during	  their	  stay	  (though	  they	  would	  nonetheless	  extoll	  the	  virtues	  of	  the	  Soviet	  system	  upon	  returning	  to	  East	  Germany).58	  	  Thus	  in	  the	  Federal	  Republic,	  western	  styles	  of	  thought	  and	  ways	  of	  life	  were	  becoming	  increasingly	  more	  admired	  and	  emulated,	  while	  in	  the	  GDR	  interest	  in	  the	  Soviet	  style	  was	  more	  limited,	  if	  it	  even	  existed	  at	  all.59	  	  The	  only	  contact	  the	  GDR	  had	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  was	  its	  soldiers	  who	  remained	  more	  or	  less	  “sequestered”	  in	  their	  barracks,	  whereas	  the	  Federal	  Republic	  received	  influences	  of	  French	  high	  culture,	  English	  music,	  and	  American	  economic	  success.60	  
Indeed,	  the	  West	  German	  began	  to	  see	  himself	  much	  more	  as	  a	  citizen	  of	  Europe	  than	  in	  previous	  decades,	  echoing	  popular	  Chancellor	  Konrad	  Adenauer’s	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  55	  Jarausch,	  108.	  56	  Ibid.,	  108.	  57	  Ibid.,	  108.	  58	  Ibid.,	  108.	  59	  Ibid.,	  109.	  60	  Ibid.,	  111.	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sentiments	  of	  “remain[ing]	  a	  German,	  but	  also	  feel[ing]	  like	  a	  European.”61	  	  Due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  all	  of	  what	  had	  been	  Eastern	  Germany	  had	  been	  given	  to	  Poland	  and	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  and	  that	  much	  of	  former	  Central	  Germany	  had	  become	  the	  GDR,	  the	  remaining	  western	  portion	  of	  Germany	  was	  all	  but	  forced	  to	  cooperate	  with	  Western	  Europe	  for	  economic	  reasons.62	  	  Western	  Europe	  was	  quite	  willing	  to	  cooperate	  with	  Germany,	  as	  German	  coal	  was	  necessary	  for	  many	  of	  the	  continent’s	  industries.	  	  Religion,	  too,	  proved	  a	  factor,	  as	  some	  middle	  class	  politicians,	  both	  in	  Germany,	  and	  across	  Western	  Europe	  called	  for	  a	  rebirth	  of	  the	  “Christian	  Occident,”	  which	  appealed	  to	  many	  conservative-­‐leaning	  Catholics.63	  	  The	  inclusion	  of	  West	  Germany	  in	  the	  European	  Recovery	  Program	  further	  catalyzed	  the	  West	  Germans’	  sense	  of	  being	  European	  and	  Western.64	  	  Even	  more,	  the	  Berlin	  Airlift	  provided	  “tangible	  proof”	  that	  the	  Western	  powers	  would	  stick	  up	  for	  them.65	  
In	  the	  East,	  GDR	  citizens	  did	  not	  feel	  the	  same	  feelings	  of	  support	  from	  the	  Eastern	  Block	  as	  their	  Federal	  Republic	  counterparts	  felt	  from	  the	  West.	  	  As	  Jarausch	  writes	  “the	  discrepancy	  between	  SED	  propaganda	  and	  East	  German	  reality	  undermined	  the	  credibility	  of	  communism.”66	  	  Yet	  the	  hardline	  SED	  government	  led	  by	  Walter	  Ulbricht	  was	  not	  initially	  without	  alternatives.	  	  Ulbricht	  had	  to,	  on	  occasion,	  contend	  with	  voices	  within	  the	  party	  elite	  who	  tried	  to	  advance	  slightly	  modified	  visions	  of	  a	  socialist	  Germany,	  including	  Rudolf	  Herrnstadt,	  the	  editor	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  61	  From	  a	  speech	  in	  1946,	  Jarausch,	  111;	  Fulbrook,	  157.	  62	  Jarausch,	  112.	  63	  Ibid.,	  112.	  64	  Ibid.,	  113.	  65	  Ibid.,	  113.	  66	  Ibid.,	  114.	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the	  newspaper	  Neues	  Deutschland,	  and	  Wilhem	  Zaisser,	  the	  minister	  for	  state	  security.67	  	  It	  was	  becoming	  increasingly	  clear	  to	  the	  East	  Germans	  that	  they	  had	  exchanged	  one	  totalitarian	  state	  for	  another,	  causing	  one	  alienated	  socialist	  to	  lament:	  “And	  that’s	  what	  we’ve	  fought	  for!”68	  	  The	  1953	  East	  German	  workers’	  revolt	  served	  as	  somewhat	  of	  an	  obverse	  to	  the	  Berlin	  Airlift,	  as	  Soviet	  troops	  intervened	  on	  the	  behalf	  of	  the	  SED	  against	  the	  striking	  workers,	  killing	  21.69	  	  After	  the	  June	  Uprising,	  as	  the	  strike	  came	  to	  be	  known,	  Ulbricht	  was	  forced	  to	  backpedal	  and	  lower	  work	  norms,	  but	  was	  nonetheless	  able	  to	  consolidate	  political	  power	  as,	  under	  the	  supervision	  of	  the	  Russians,	  Herrnstadt	  and	  Zaisser	  from	  were	  removed	  their	  posts	  and	  expelled	  from	  the	  SED	  as	  “provocateurs”	  along	  with	  over	  70,000	  other	  Social	  Democrats.70	  
Unlike	  Adenauer	  in	  the	  West,	  Ulbricht	  was	  not	  popular	  with	  citizens	  of	  the	  GDR.71	  	  His	  use	  of	  oppression	  required	  that	  Germans	  lead	  a	  double-­‐life,	  to	  which,	  historian	  Mary	  Fulbrook	  writes,	  “many	  Germans	  had	  become	  all	  too	  accustomed,	  in	  different	  ways,	  under	  the	  Nazi	  regime.”72	  	  However,	  the	  comparative	  economic	  misfortune	  of	  East	  Germany	  also	  had	  an	  affect	  on	  his	  popularity	  –	  people	  simply	  felt	  the	  standard	  of	  living	  was	  too	  low.73	  	  Thus,	  East	  Germans	  did	  not	  experience	  the	  same	  shift	  in	  their	  identity	  as	  West	  Germans.	  	  The	  construction	  of	  the	  Berlin	  Wall	  (officially	  called	  the	  “anti-­‐Fascist	  rampart”	  by	  the	  GDR	  government)	  in	  1961	  served	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  154.	  68	  Fulbrook,	  154;	  Jarausch,	  114.	  69	  Fulbrook,	  155.	  70	  Ibid.,	  156.	  71	  Ibid.,	  157.	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  Ibid.,	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as	  proof	  that	  the	  division	  of	  Germany	  was	  to	  be	  permanent.74	  	  Additionally,	  East	  Germans	  were	  left	  feeling	  betrayed	  by	  the	  administration,	  as	  Ulbricht	  had	  promised	  them	  “no	  one	  intends	  to	  build	  a	  wall,”	  just	  weeks	  before	  the	  construction	  of	  the	  wall.75	  	  To	  them,	  to	  be	  German	  was	  to	  keep	  one’s	  head	  down	  for	  fear	  of	  the	  regime,	  just	  as	  it	  had	  been	  under	  the	  Nazis.	  
	  
Western	  influences	  
Although	  West	  Germans,	  and	  the	  Federal	  government,	  had	  decided	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  West,	  the	  decision	  was	  now	  to	  be	  made	  as	  to	  exactly	  which	  West	  they	  wanted	  to	  be	  a	  part	  of.	  	  The	  Anglo-­‐American	  sympathizers,	  who	  came	  to	  be	  known	  as	  Atlanticists,	  called	  for	  close	  cooperation	  with	  the	  UK	  and	  the	  US.76	  	  Among	  their	  ranks	  were	  commercial	  figures	  who	  wanted	  to	  be	  party	  to	  free-­‐trade	  agreements	  and	  military	  figures	  who	  looked	  for	  the	  superiority	  of	  American	  military	  technology	  and	  strength	  to	  protect	  the	  Federal	  Republic	  from	  the	  threat	  posed	  by	  the	  USSR.77	  	  On	  the	  other	  end	  of	  the	  spectrum	  were	  the	  Gaullists,	  so	  called	  because	  of	  their	  desire	  for	  close	  relations	  with	  France	  and	  French	  President	  Charles	  de	  Gaulle,	  as	  well	  as	  for	  a	  strong,	  centralized	  Europe.78	  	  Gaullists	  noted	  the	  French	  influences	  in	  German	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  74	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  2.	  75	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  hat	  die	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  zu	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  video,	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  Posted	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  2011,	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  The	  Emergence	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  Détente	  in	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  Brandt,	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formulation	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  (New	  York:	  	  Routledge,	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culture	  and	  society	  (e.g.	  the	  Code	  Napoléon),	  and	  were	  in	  favor	  of	  De	  Gaulle’s	  policy	  of	  greater	  independence	  from	  the	  US.79	  
These	  disagreements	  came	  to	  a	  head	  in	  1963	  during	  the	  negotiation	  of	  the	  Elysée	  Treaty,	  a	  Franco-­‐German	  friendship	  agreement.80	  	  Atlanticists,	  including	  Adenauer’s	  Finance	  Minister	  and	  successor	  Ludwig	  Erhard,	  insisted	  on	  a	  preamble	  which	  reasserted	  Germany’s	  commitment	  to	  America	  and	  expressed	  the	  German	  desire	  for	  British	  admittance	  to	  the	  European	  Economic	  Community.81	  	  In	  response,	  the	  Gaullists	  helped	  engineer	  the	  downfall	  of	  Erhard	  three	  years	  later.82	  	  The	  proximity	  of	  the	  Federal	  Republic	  to	  France	  required	  close	  economic	  relationships,	  while	  the	  military	  threat	  from	  the	  East	  required	  American	  military	  protection.	  	  It	  was	  clear	  that	  West	  Germany	  needed	  to	  be	  friends	  with	  both	  France	  and	  the	  United	  States	  in	  order	  to	  operate	  a	  stable,	  democratic	  government.	  
While	  the	  governments	  of	  Adenauer,	  Erhard,	  and	  later	  Kurt	  Georg	  Kiesinger	  struggled	  to	  strike	  a	  balance	  between	  French	  and	  Anglo-­‐American	  friendships,	  the	  culture	  of	  Germany	  was	  rapidly	  and	  decisively	  accepting	  of	  American	  (and	  to	  a	  lesser	  extent	  British)	  influence.	  	  By	  the	  mid-­‐1960s,	  American-­‐style	  comic	  books	  had	  replaced	  traditional	  children’s	  literature,	  while	  Mickey	  Mouse	  and	  Tarzan	  were	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  80	  Hofmann,	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  Anne	  Lefevbre,	  Deutschland	  und	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  in	  France	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  (Accessed,	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popular	  television	  programs.83	  	  American	  music	  was	  also	  extremely	  popular,	  as	  artists	  like	  Elvis	  Presley	  introduced	  Germans	  to	  rock	  and	  roll,	  while	  others	  were	  exposed	  to	  the	  world	  of	  Black	  Americans	  through	  jazz	  music.84	  	  Even	  more	  fascinating	  for	  Germans	  were	  American	  Hollywood	  movies,	  which	  were	  “technically	  superior”	  to	  domestic	  films.85	  	  	  
Jarausch	  notes	  “transmission	  of	  new	  patterns	  of	  mass	  consumption	  also	  reinforced	  the	  tendency	  toward	  Americanization	  in	  German	  society.”86	  	  German	  women	  “yearned”	  for	  imported	  cosmetics,	  nylon	  stockings,	  and	  more	  fashionable	  clothes,	  while	  rebellious	  German	  teens	  and	  young	  adults	  expressed	  their	  newfound	  independence	  by	  wearing	  blue	  jeans.87	  	  Even	  businessmen	  showed	  their	  preference	  for	  the	  new	  style	  by	  wearing	  American	  business	  suits	  and	  drinking	  scotch	  and	  bourbon	  like	  their	  Hollywood	  role	  models.88	  	  The	  renewed	  economic	  prosperity	  in	  the	  Federal	  Republic	  allowed	  West	  German	  households	  to	  purchase	  consumer	  goods	  such	  as	  vacuum	  cleaners,	  kitchen	  appliances	  and	  radios	  and	  television	  sets.89	  	  The	  free	  market	  was	  winning	  over	  the	  West	  German	  people.	  
In	  the	  East,	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  was	  nowhere	  near	  as	  successful	  at	  igniting	  a	  cultural	  revolution	  as	  the	  Americans	  in	  the	  West.	  	  According	  to	  Jarausch,	  “only	  an	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  Ibid.,	  122.	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  Ibid.,	  122-­‐123.	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  Ibid.,	  123.	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educated	  minority	  was	  interested	  in	  ‘the	  culture	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union.’”90	  	  Russian	  offerings	  of	  literature,	  classical	  music,	  or	  ballet,	  while	  generally	  well	  received	  by	  critics	  and	  academics,	  were	  nonetheless	  largely	  ignored	  by	  GDR	  citizens.	  	  To	  East	  Germans,	  Russia’s	  most	  impressive	  contribution	  was	  the	  Soviet	  space	  program;	  Sputnik’s	  flight	  through	  the	  sky	  “seemed	  to	  prove	  socialism’s	  ability	  to	  succeed	  in	  the	  future.”91	  	  By	  and	  large,	  however,	  East	  Germans	  passively	  resisted	  a	  Russification	  of	  their	  culture,	  as	  evidenced	  by	  the	  reluctance	  of	  many	  to	  learn	  Russian,	  a	  required	  language	  in	  GDR	  schools.92	  	  Many	  had	  already	  left	  for	  the	  West	  before	  the	  wall’s	  construction	  in	  1961—the	  Federal	  Republic	  was	  simply	  a	  more	  attractive	  place	  to	  live.93	  
Instead	  of	  a	  Russian	  one,	  a	  “subcutaneous”	  Americanization	  began	  to	  emerge,	  despite	  the	  officially	  anti-­‐American	  party	  line	  of	  the	  SED.	  	  What	  little	  American	  culture	  East	  Germans	  could	  consume	  brought	  them	  a	  sense	  of	  wonderment	  at	  the	  American	  lifestyle.	  	  The	  inevitable	  ban	  of	  American	  music	  and	  movies	  only	  “led	  East	  German	  citizens	  to	  fantasize	  about	  America	  as	  an	  incarnation	  of	  a	  better	  life.”94	  	   Unlike	  their	  subdued	  Eastern	  counterparts,	  West	  Germans	  held	  “unambiguously	  positive”	  feelings	  towards	  America	  throughout	  much	  of	  the	  1960s.95	  	  However	  this	  was	  all	  about	  to	  change	  as	  some	  would	  object	  to	  the	  Vietnam	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War,	  which	  was	  seen	  as	  imperialistic.96	  	  The	  coming	  wave	  of	  student	  movements	  and	  demonstrations	  would	  cause	  many	  Germans	  to	  rethink	  their	  current	  policies	  and	  alignment.	  
	  
Choosing	  a	  New	  Direction	  
	   As	  the	  1960s	  wore	  on,	  many	  young	  West	  Germans	  grew	  more	  and	  more	  dissatisfied	  with	  the	  state	  of	  affairs	  in	  their	  country,	  which	  came	  as	  somewhat	  of	  a	  surprise	  after	  two	  decades	  of	  fairly	  smooth	  democratization.97	  	  Inspired	  in	  part	  by	  peaceful	  civil	  rights	  protests	  in	  the	  US,	  students	  at	  the	  Freie	  Universität	  in	  Berlin	  staged	  Germany’s	  first	  “sit-­‐in”	  in	  1966.98	  	  The	  demonstrators	  called	  for	  the	  reinstatement	  of	  a	  leftist	  assistant	  professor	  who	  had	  been	  dismissed,	  and	  more	  generally	  for	  “the	  dismantling	  of	  oligarchic	  tyranny	  and	  the	  realization	  of	  democratic	  freedom	  in	  all	  areas	  of	  society.”99	  	  In	  the	  following	  years	  other	  student	  protests	  took	  place,	  often	  calling	  for	  a	  more	  liberal,	  Marxist	  society	  and	  taking	  objection	  to	  apparent	  institutional	  unfairness,	  perceived	  governmental	  abetting	  of	  American	  imperialism	  and	  former	  Nazis	  in	  positions	  of	  power.	  
The	  first	  point	  of	  contention	  between	  the	  students	  and	  the	  West	  German	  society	  was	  the	  conditions	  in	  the	  universities.	  	  Students	  mocked	  the	  current	  administrations	  of	  their	  schools	  with	  the	  phrase	  “Unter	  den	  Talaren	  –	  Muff	  von	  1000	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Jahren,”	  loosely	  “Underneath	  the	  [academic]	  robes	  –	  thousand	  year	  old	  mustiness.”100	  	  This	  not	  only	  directly	  accused	  the	  university	  officials	  of	  being	  old	  fashioned,	  but	  also	  cleverly	  hinted	  at	  hidden	  Nazi	  ideologies	  (cf.	  tausendjähriges	  
Reich,	  “thousand	  year	  Reich”).	  	  Another	  incendiary	  issue	  was	  the	  Federal	  Republic’s	  support	  of	  the	  American	  intervention	  in	  Vietnam	  against	  the	  Communist	  Viet	  Cong.101	  	  Students,	  many	  of	  whom	  were	  Marxist	  sympathizers,	  felt	  that	  the	  US	  was	  executing	  an	  imperialist	  foreign	  policy	  in	  its	  aid	  of	  the	  South	  Vietnamese	  against	  Ho	  Chi	  Minh.	  	  The	  final	  and	  chief	  reason	  for	  the	  student	  protests	  was	  a	  “generational	  alienation”	  between	  the	  postwar	  generation	  and	  their	  parents.	  	  Many	  young	  West	  Germans	  struggled	  to	  come	  to	  grips	  with	  their	  fathers’	  involvement	  with	  the	  Nazi	  regime.102	  	  Furthermore,	  the	  discovery	  of	  a	  multitude	  of	  “brown”	  judges,	  politicians—including	  Chancellor	  Kurt	  Georg	  Kiesinger—and	  professors	  called	  the	  entire	  success	  of	  denazification	  into	  question.103	  	  The	  fatal	  shooting	  of	  peaceful,	  unarmed	  protester	  Benno	  Ohnesorg	  in	  1967	  by	  a	  police	  officer	  at	  a	  protest	  against	  the	  American-­‐backed	  Shah	  of	  Iran	  was	  the	  catalyst	  in	  the	  shift	  towards	  more	  radical,	  and	  sometimes	  violent,	  forms	  of	  protests.104	  	  While	  the	  students	  who	  were	  protesting	  were	  by	  no	  means	  the	  majority,	  the	  spread	  of	  the	  68er	  movement,	  as	  it	  came	  to	  be	  known,	  reached	  not	  only	  universities	  in	  large	  cities	  like	  Berlin,	  Frankfurt,	  Hamburg,	  and	  Munich,	  but	  also	  small,	  traditional	  university	  towns	  such	  as	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Göttingen,	  Heidelberg,	  Marburg,	  and	  Tübingen.105	  	  And	  while	  the	  68ers	  were	  unable	  to	  cause	  a	  “revolutionary	  seizure	  of	  power”	  as	  called	  for	  by	  Rudi	  Dutschke,	  a	  leader	  of	  the	  movement,	  Germany	  nonetheless	  became	  more	  liberal	  with	  Willy	  Brandt	  and	  the	  SPD	  coming	  into	  power	  in	  1969.106	  
	   Many	  former	  revolutionaries	  and	  liberal	  leftists	  point	  to	  Brandt’s	  Ostpolitik	  as	  an	  impact	  that	  liberalization	  had	  on	  the	  Federal	  Republic.107	  	  Ostpolitik	  hinged	  on	  three	  main	  agreements.	  	  The	  first,	  the	  1970	  Treaty	  of	  Moscow	  stipulated	  that	  both	  the	  USSR	  and	  the	  Federal	  Republic	  renounced	  the	  use	  of	  force,	  and	  that	  the	  Federal	  Republic	  acknowledged	  the	  Oder-­‐Neisse	  line	  as	  the	  border	  between	  Germany	  and	  Poland.108	  	  The	  second,	  the	  Treaty	  of	  Warsaw,	  which	  was	  signed	  later	  in	  1970,	  reiterated	  the	  same	  commitment	  to	  the	  Oder-­‐Neisse	  line	  and	  established	  diplomatic	  relations	  between	  the	  Federal	  Republic	  and	  the	  People’s	  Republic	  of	  Poland.109	  	  The	  third	  and	  most	  controversial	  was	  the	  1972	  Grundlagenvertrag,	  the	  Basic	  Treaty,	  which	  stipulated	  that	  the	  Federal	  Republic	  acknowledge	  that	  there	  were	  “two	  states	  in	  one	  German	  nation,”	  and	  allow	  for	  diplomatic	  relations	  between	  the	  GDR	  and	  other	  nations,	  effectively	  rendering	  the	  Hallstein	  Doctrine	  moot.110	  	  
	   This	  quick	  succession	  of	  treaties	  completely	  altered	  the	  relationship	  between	  East	  and	  West	  Germany,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  one	  between	  West	  Germany	  and	  the	  Soviet	  Bloc.	  	  It	  also	  showed	  that	  Germany	  no	  longer	  thought	  of	  itself	  as	  the	  old	  German	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Reich,	  but	  rather	  a	  completely	  new	  state,	  uninterested	  in	  expansion.	  	  This	  shift	  in	  fundamental	  ideology	  was	  a	  definitive	  break	  from	  the	  century-­‐old	  tradition	  of	  expansionistic	  Prussians,	  German	  Imperialists,	  and	  Nazis.	  	  Germans	  no	  longer	  thought	  of	  themselves	  as	  dogmatic	  conquerors,	  instead	  they	  thought	  of	  themselves	  as	  peaceful,	  democratic,	  and	  cooperative	  people.	  
	  
Conclusion	  to	  Chapter	  2	  
	   The	  competitive	  nature	  of	  the	  modernizations	  happening	  on	  either	  side	  of	  the	  iron	  curtain	  created	  two	  distinct	  versions	  of	  a	  “modern”	  Germany.111	  	  In	  the	  East,	  the	  Soviet	  overlords	  forced	  the	  development	  of	  a	  Socialist	  state,	  founded	  on	  the	  principles	  of	  Marxism	  and	  anti-­‐Nazism,	  whose	  populace	  were	  becoming	  increasingly	  aware	  of	  the	  oppression	  under	  which	  they	  lived.	  	  In	  the	  West,	  the	  allies	  allowed	  for	  a	  somewhat	  more	  organic	  democracy	  to	  evolve,	  one	  in	  which,	  once	  established,	  the	  Germans	  ruled	  themselves.	  	  Through	  the	  influence	  of	  American	  popular	  culture,	  the	  Federal	  Republic	  developed	  a	  thriving	  consumer	  society	  in	  the	  late	  1950s	  and	  early	  1960s,	  while	  the	  East	  Germans	  were	  largely	  indifferent	  towards	  Russian	  culture,	  and	  generally	  weren’t	  swayed	  by	  anti-­‐West	  propaganda.	  	  Just	  as	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  the	  latter	  part	  of	  the	  1960s	  brought	  social	  upheaval	  in	  West	  Germany	  as	  anti-­‐War	  demonstrators	  and	  Marxists	  protested	  against	  the	  perceived	  imperialism	  and	  old	  Nazis	  in	  the	  establishment,	  causing	  many	  to	  doubt	  the	  success	  of	  denazification.	  	  In	  the	  end,	  however,	  this	  culminated	  in	  the	  election	  of	  a	  more	  liberal	  administration.	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At	  the	  end	  of	  the	  period,	  Brandt	  and	  the	  SPD’s	  Ostpolitik	  ushered	  in	  a	  new	  era	  of	  coexistence	  in	  which	  both	  German	  states	  acknowledged	  the	  other	  as	  legitimate,	  while	  still	  disagreeing	  ideologically.	  	  Both	  states	  were	  deliberate	  and	  permanent,	  no	  longer	  the	  seemingly	  temporary	  entities	  that	  had	  arisen	  somewhat	  accidentally	  from	  the	  divided	  occupation	  zones.	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Chapter	  3	  –	  Identities	  Converge:	  From	  Ostpolitik	  to	  the	  Fall	  of	  the	  Wall	  
	  
West	  Germany	  after	  Ostpolitik	  
The	  1970s	  saw	  a	  new	  era	  of	  eased	  tensions	  in	  Eastern	  Europe.	  	  With	  the	  Russians	  and	  Americans	  preoccupied	  with	  conflicts	  in	  Asia,	  the	  two	  Germanies	  were	  allowed	  a	  bit	  of	  leeway	  in	  constructing	  their	  own	  détente.112	  	  Although	  the	  newly	  forged	  relationship	  between	  the	  GDR	  and	  the	  Federal	  Republic	  pleased	  many	  Germans	  on	  both	  sides	  of	  the	  Iron	  Curtain,	  Ostpolitik	  was	  not	  without	  its	  critics.	  	  Indeed	  Brandt	  faced	  considerable	  criticism	  from	  conservatives	  in	  the	  Christian	  Democratic	  Union	  and	  Christian	  Social	  Union	  party	  (CDU/CSU).113	  	  The	  Bundestag	  barely	  ratified	  the	  Moscow	  and	  Warsaw	  Treaties	  in	  1970	  and	  the	  Basic	  Treaty	  in	  1972.114	  	  Though	  the	  political	  opposition	  to	  Brandt’s	  policies	  came	  mainly	  from	  the	  Right,	  there	  were	  a	  small	  number	  of	  former	  68ers	  who	  felt	  the	  Federal	  Republic	  needed	  to	  liberalize	  even	  further.	  	  The	  reforms	  had	  certainly	  satisfied	  many	  of	  the	  student	  protesters,	  but	  a	  handful	  of	  extreme	  leftists	  calling	  themselves	  the	  Rote	  
Armee	  Fraktion,	  or	  “Red	  Army	  Faction”	  began	  taking	  more	  aggressive	  and	  violent	  actions.	  	  The	  RAF	  was	  led	  by	  radicals	  Andreas	  Baader,	  Gudrun	  Ensslin,	  and	  Ulrike	  Meinhof,	  a	  former	  journalist	  who	  joined	  the	  group	  after	  helping	  Baader	  escape	  from	  prison	  during	  an	  interview	  in	  1970.115	  	  RAF	  actions	  such	  as	  bombings	  of	  department	  stores,	  police	  stations,	  and	  American	  army	  bases,	  as	  well	  as	  bank	  robberies	  were	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deemed	  acts	  of	  terrorism	  by	  the	  Federal	  government.116	  	  The	  perpetrators	  justified	  these	  attacks	  as	  necessary	  anti-­‐capitalist	  and	  anti-­‐imperialist	  actions.117	  	  By	  1972,	  the	  main	  figures	  of	  the	  RAF	  including	  Baader,	  Ensslin,	  and	  Meinhof	  had	  been	  arrested,	  but	  the	  seeds	  of	  the	  RAF	  had	  been	  sown,	  and	  new	  recruits	  were	  joining	  the	  ranks.118	  	  Interestingly,	  the	  public	  opinion	  towards	  the	  Baader-­‐Meinhof	  Group	  as	  they	  were	  sometimes	  called,	  was	  not	  completely	  negative,	  as	  many	  Germans	  could	  identify	  at	  least	  somewhat	  with	  the	  goals	  of	  the	  group,	  though	  not	  necessarily	  with	  their	  actions.	  	  Many	  were	  also	  critical	  of	  the	  state’s	  responses	  to	  the	  terrorists.119	  	  Though	  the	  public	  reaction	  to	  this	  domestic	  terrorism	  was	  somewhat	  mixed,	  the	  reaction	  to	  the	  international	  terrorism	  perpetrated	  at	  the	  Munich	  Olympics	  was	  not.	  
A	  week	  into	  the	  1972	  Olympics,	  a	  group	  of	  Palestinian	  terrorists	  from	  the	  group	  Black	  September,	  who	  had	  been	  working	  with	  the	  RAF,	  shot	  2	  Israeli	  Olympic	  team	  members	  and	  took	  9	  more	  hostage,	  demanding	  release	  of	  Palestinian	  (and	  a	  few	  RAF)	  prisoners;	  the	  conflict	  ultimately	  ended	  in	  a	  shootout	  whereby	  all	  of	  the	  hostages	  were	  killed.120	  	  These	  Olympics	  were	  meant	  to	  symbolize	  Germany’s	  peacefulness	  and	  showcase	  it’s	  ascension	  into	  the	  modern	  world.121	  	  The	  Olympic	  village	  was	  lightly	  policed	  as	  a	  result	  of	  a	  desire	  to	  shed	  the	  authoritarian	  image	  of	  National	  Socialism.	  	  The	  terrorists,	  who	  had	  been	  assisted	  in	  planning	  the	  operation	  by	  the	  RAF,	  were	  thus	  able	  to	  slip	  in	  to	  the	  Israeli	  quarters	  and	  use	  the	  attention	  the	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Olympics	  were	  getting	  worldwide	  to	  further	  their	  own	  agenda.122	  	  The	  reaction	  to	  this	  act	  of	  terrorism	  was	  much	  stronger,	  and	  the	  German	  people	  learned	  an	  important	  lesson	  	  –	  West	  Germany	  needed	  a	  way	  to	  combat	  terrorism	  in	  its	  own	  country.	  	  The	  Federal	  Republic	  could	  not	  afford	  not	  to	  have	  anti-­‐terrorism	  programs	  under	  the	  pretense	  of	  shedding	  its	  Nazi	  past.	  	  Germans	  needed	  to	  become	  comfortable	  with	  at	  least	  some	  police	  presence.	  	  
	   Having	  succeeded	  in	  enacting	  his	  Ostpolitik	  agenda,	  Willy	  Brandt	  lost	  some	  of	  his	  “zest	  for	  governing,”	  and	  resigned	  in	  1974	  after	  it	  was	  discovered	  that	  Günter	  Guillaume,	  one	  of	  his	  senior	  aides,	  was	  an	  East	  German	  spy.123	  	  Brandt’s	  successor	  and	  fellow	  SPD	  Member,	  Helmut	  Schmidt,	  was	  more	  “energetic	  and	  determined.”124	  	  He	  faced	  considerable	  adversity,	  not	  only	  from	  the	  conservative	  CDU/CSU,	  but	  also	  from	  elements	  within	  his	  own	  party,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  SDP’s	  coalition	  partners,	  the	  FDP.125	  	  The	  energy	  crises	  of	  the	  1970s,	  and	  the	  somewhat	  conservative	  Schmidt’s	  attempts	  to	  replace	  oil	  with	  nuclear	  energy,	  saw	  criticism	  from	  more	  liberal	  members	  of	  the	  Social	  Democrats	  and	  FDP.126	  	  In	  1977	  Schmidt	  and	  the	  Federal	  Republic	  also	  faced	  a	  new	  wave	  of	  RAF	  terror,	  as	  the	  group’s	  Deutscher	  Herbst	  plan	  was	  put	  into	  action.	  	  RAF	  members	  murdered	  Federal	  Judge	  Siegfried	  Buback,	  and	  Jürgen	  Ponto,	  the	  Chairman	  of	  the	  Dresdner	  Bank,	  and	  kidnapped	  and	  later	  murdered	  the	  head	  of	  the	  German	  Employers’	  Association	  Hanns	  Martin	  Schleyer.127	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Along	  with	  a	  RAF-­‐coordinated	  Palestinian	  terrorist	  group’s	  hijacking	  of	  a	  Lufthansa	  flight,	  the	  Deutscher	  Herbst	  was	  meant	  to	  facilitate	  the	  release	  of	  Baader,	  Ensslin,	  Meinhof,	  and	  other	  top	  brass	  RAF	  members.128	  	  However,	  the	  government	  was	  much	  better	  prepared	  for	  the	  terrorist	  action,	  and	  the	  plane	  was	  safely	  recovered	  without	  any	  death	  of	  hostages	  other	  than	  the	  pilot.	  Germany	  had	  weathered	  the	  worst	  of	  domestic	  and	  international	  terrorism.129	  
	   Unfortunately	  for	  Schmidt,	  the	  oil	  shortage	  was	  becoming	  direr,	  and	  to	  make	  matters	  worse,	  the	  average	  age	  of	  Germany	  was	  rising	  steadily,	  which	  was	  also	  hurting	  the	  economy.130	  	  Though	  in	  the	  past	  the	  foreign	  Gastarbeiter	  had	  been	  able	  to	  fill	  some	  of	  the	  demographic	  gaps,	  they	  were	  generally	  not	  considered	  welcome	  in	  the	  society,	  which	  led	  to	  other	  problems,	  and	  discouraged	  more	  potential	  
Gastarbeiter.131	  	  Due	  to	  disagreements	  on	  numerous	  economic	  issues,	  the	  FDP,	  Schmidt	  and	  the	  SPD’s	  coalition	  partner,	  switched	  sides	  to	  the	  CDU/CSU,	  creating	  a	  new	  majority	  in	  the	  Bundestag.132	  	  In	  1982,	  after	  a	  constructive	  vote	  of	  no	  confidence,	  Schmidt	  was	  removed	  from	  office,	  and	  Helmut	  Kohl	  was	  put	  in	  his	  place.133	  	  Kohl’s	  new,	  more	  conservative	  government	  was	  fairly	  successful	  at	  righting	  the	  economic	  ship,	  and	  the	  budget	  deficit	  was	  successfully	  cut.134	  	  Additionally,	  the	  German	  manufacturing	  sector	  shifted	  its	  focus	  from	  traditional	  heavy	  industry	  centered	  on	  the	  Rhine-­‐Ruhr	  area	  to	  microelectronics	  industries	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further	  south,	  in	  the	  Frankfurt,	  Munich,	  and	  Stuttgart	  areas.135	  	  While	  CDU/CSU	  support	  grew,	  the	  SPD	  found	  its	  position	  somewhat	  unstable,	  as	  many	  of	  its	  former	  supporters	  who	  favored	  ecological	  conservation	  left	  for	  the	  new	  Green	  Party.136	  	  The	  growing	  importance	  of	  ecological	  issues	  was	  punctuated	  by	  the	  problems	  the	  Federal	  Republic	  was	  having	  with	  acid	  rain.137	  
	  
Honecker’s	  East	  Germany	  
In	  East	  Germany,	  changes	  were	  afoot	  as	  well.	  	  Erich	  Honecker	  replaced	  an	  aging	  Walter	  Ulbricht	  as	  head	  of	  the	  SED	  in	  1971.138	  	  Honecker	  was	  more	  open	  to	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  GDR	  having	  a	  relationship	  with	  the	  West	  than	  his	  predecessor,	  and	  it	  was	  under	  his	  guidance	  that	  the	  Basic	  Treaty	  was	  signed.139	  	  With	  the	  Hallstein	  Doctrine	  effectively	  revoked,	  the	  GDR	  under	  Honecker	  was	  able	  to	  establish	  diplomatic	  relations	  with	  many	  western	  countries,	  including	  the	  USA.140	  	  The	  1970s	  saw	  a	  reorganization	  of	  the	  East	  German	  economic	  sphere,	  beginning	  with	  a	  recentralization	  at	  the	  end	  of	  Ulbricht’s	  time	  as	  leader,	  and	  continuing	  under	  Honecker.141	  	  The	  GDR’s	  economic	  cooperation	  with	  the	  Federal	  Republic	  –	  West	  Germany	  accounted	  for	  about	  a	  third	  of	  the	  foreign	  trade	  –	  allowed	  it	  to	  weather	  the	  economic	  downturn	  of	  the	  late	  1970s	  and	  early	  1980s	  much	  better	  than	  many	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Eastern	  Bloc	  nations.142	  	  Simultaneously,	  however,	  the	  energy	  crises	  were	  detrimental	  to	  the	  economy	  since	  the	  GDR	  imported	  a	  large	  portion	  of	  its	  energy	  at	  unfavorable	  prices	  from	  the	  USSR.143	  	  To	  counteract	  this,	  the	  GDR	  utilized	  much	  more	  of	  its	  own	  natural	  fuel	  resource,	  lignite,	  or	  brown	  coal,	  which	  emitted	  considerable	  smoke	  and	  pollution	  during	  combustion.144	  	  This	  increased	  pollution,	  and	  the	  indifference	  of	  the	  East	  German	  government	  towards	  
Umweltverschmutzung,	  ran	  counter	  to	  increased	  West	  German	  environmental	  efforts.	  
	   In	  1974,	  the	  GDR	  ratified	  a	  new	  constitution,	  one	  which	  introduced	  a	  new	  definition	  of	  the	  GDR	  state:	  
	   	   The	  people	  of	  the	  GDR,	  carrying	  on	  the	  revolutionary	  tradition	  of	  the	  	   German	  working	  class,	  and	  aided	  by	  the	  liberation	  from	  fascism,	  in	  	   accordance	  with	  the	  processes	  of	  the	  historical	  development	  of	  our	  epoch,	  	   have	  realized	  their	  right	  to	  social,	  economic,	  state	  and	  national	  self-­‐	   determination	  and	  created	  a	  developed	  socialist	  society.145	  
The	  constitution	  also	  detailed	  that	  the	  GDR	  was	  a	  “socialist	  state	  of	  workers	  and	  peasants,”	  and	  that	  the	  government	  was	  to	  be	  an	  “organization	  of	  the	  workers	  in	  town	  and	  country	  under	  the	  leadership	  of	  the	  working	  class	  and	  its	  Marxist-­‐Leninist	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  142	  Fulbrook,	  175.	  143	  Ibid.,	  175.	  144	  Ibid.,	  175.	  145	  “GDR	  Constitution,	  7	  October	  1974,”	  in	  Uniting	  Germany:	  Documents	  and	  Debates,	  
1944-­‐1993,	  ed.	  Konrad	  H.	  Jarausch	  and	  Volker	  Gransow	  (Providence:	  	  Berghahn	  Books,	  1994),	  23-­‐24.	  
	   Kirby	  33	  
party.”146	  	  The	  official	  party	  line	  was	  thus	  made	  clear	  –	  the	  GDR	  was	  to	  be	  of	  and	  for	  the	  people.	  	  But	  the	  GDR	  no	  longer	  claimed	  to	  represent	  all	  Germans,	  but	  rather,	  only	  those	  workers	  and	  peasants	  living	  within	  its	  borders.	  	  Another	  important	  section	  of	  the	  constitution	  pledged	  that	  “the	  GDR	  will	  never	  start	  a	  war	  of	  aggression	  or	  use	  its	  armed	  forces	  against	  the	  freedom	  of	  another	  people,”	  indicating	  there	  would	  be	  no	  attempt	  of	  forceful	  reunification.147	  	  It	  also	  pledged	  GDR	  friendship	  with	  the	  USSR,	  a	  relationship	  formally	  sealed	  in	  a	  1975	  treaty.148	  	  All	  in	  all,	  the	  new	  constitution	  was	  important	  in	  helping	  create	  an	  official	  concept	  of	  the	  GDR,	  separate	  from	  the	  traditional	  German	  view	  of	  their	  nation,	  as	  well	  as	  in	  legitimizing	  the	  GDR	  as	  a	  state	  entirely	  separate	  from	  the	  Federal	  Republic.	  	  	   	  
Although	  the	  GDR’s	  new	  constitution	  was	  in	  general	  more	  liberal,	  many	  East	  German	  artists	  found	  themselves	  at	  odds	  with	  Honecker’s	  government.	  	  The	  late	  1970s	  ushered	  in	  an	  era	  of	  renewed	  oppression,	  causing	  many	  of	  the	  creative	  minds	  of	  the	  GDR,	  for	  instance,	  musician	  Wolf	  Biermann,	  as	  well	  as	  several	  authors,	  to	  leave	  for	  the	  West.149	  	  Additionally,	  economic	  issues	  and	  energy	  crises	  caused	  the	  standard	  of	  living	  to	  sink,	  creating	  additional	  unrest.150	  	  However,	  the	  administration	  was	  not	  universally	  repressive,	  as	  evidenced	  by	  its	  1978	  agreement	  to	  accommodate	  Christian	  activities	  and	  practices.151	  	  Furthermore,	  as	  historian	  Mary	  Fulbrook	  notes,	  “the	  relative	  toleration	  of	  dissenting	  views,	  at	  least	  until	  the	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mid-­‐1980s,	  may	  have	  made	  some	  contribution	  to	  the	  political	  stability	  of	  the	  GDR.”152	  	  Another	  interesting	  political	  development	  was	  the	  beginning	  of	  Mikhail	  Gorbachev’s	  term	  as	  Soviet	  General	  Secretary	  in	  1985.	  	  Gorbachev	  ushered	  in	  the	  policies	  of	  perestroika	  and	  glasnost	  (“restructuring”	  and	  “openness”),	  which	  posed	  significant	  challenges	  to	  the	  other	  countries	  of	  the	  eastern	  bloc,	  East	  Germany	  included.153	  	  Though	  many	  in	  the	  GDR	  were	  hoping	  that	  Gorbachev’s	  influence	  would	  lead	  to	  a	  further	  democratization	  of	  the	  country,	  the	  many	  arrests	  and	  imprisonments	  of	  1987	  and	  1988	  serve	  as	  evidence	  to	  a	  contrary	  tendency.154	  
	   Though	  its	  domestic	  policies	  remained	  somewhat	  strict,	  the	  GDR’s	  relationship	  with	  the	  Federal	  Republic	  improved	  throughout	  the	  late	  1970s	  and	  1980s	  in	  spite	  of	  strained	  USA-­‐USSR	  diplomacy.155	  	  Trade	  agreements	  and	  “favorable”	  loan	  and	  credit	  agreements	  were	  just	  a	  few	  of	  the	  benefits	  of	  the	  enhanced	  relations.156	  	  Due	  to	  the	  stationing	  of	  US	  and	  NATO	  nuclear	  missiles	  in	  West	  Germany	  and	  Soviet	  missiles	  in	  East	  Germany,	  both	  nations	  thought	  of	  themselves	  as	  front-­‐line	  states,	  and	  were	  thus	  both	  interested	  in	  nuclear	  disarmament.157	  	  As	  evidence	  of	  this	  interest,	  the	  1984	  song	  99	  Luftballons,	  which	  describes	  a	  nuclear	  war	  begun	  due	  to	  a	  bunch	  of	  balloons	  being	  mistaken	  for	  a	  threat,	  was	  wildly	  popular	  on	  both	  sides	  of	  the	  wall.158	  However,	  the	  conflict	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between	  the	  two	  nations	  would	  soon	  take	  a	  backseat	  to	  the	  protests	  in	  East	  Germany,	  the	  eventual	  fall	  of	  the	  Berlin	  Wall,	  and	  ultimately	  the	  end	  of	  the	  GDR	  itself.	  
	  
A	  Gentle	  Revolution	  
	   In	  the	  early	  fall	  of	  1989,	  there	  was	  a	  rise	  in	  organized	  protest	  against	  the	  more	  authoritarian	  aspects	  of	  the	  regime.	  	  These	  protests,	  which	  came	  to	  be	  known	  as	  the	  sanfte	  Revolution	  (literally,	  gentle	  revolution),	  demanded	  more	  open	  governmental	  policies,	  such	  as	  freedom	  of	  expression,	  organization,	  and	  the	  press,	  and	  the	  right	  to	  travel.159	  	  Some	  East	  Germans	  also	  began	  defecting	  to	  West	  Germany	  by	  way	  of	  Hungary,	  which	  had	  an	  open	  border	  with	  Austria	  starting	  on	  the	  tenth	  of	  September—though	  the	  Hungarians	  had	  been	  letting	  East	  German	  defectors	  through	  without	  checking	  their	  passports	  for	  some	  time.160	  	  Others	  formed	  democratically	  inclined	  political	  groups	  and	  sought	  recognition	  in	  the	  same	  way	  the	  church	  had	  a	  decade	  before.	  	  The	  very	  existence	  of	  these	  groups,	  such	  as	  a	  GDR	  version	  of	  the	  SPD	  and	  the	  group	  Neues	  Forum,	  challenged	  the	  de	  facto	  single	  party	  system.161	  	  Their	  demands	  included	  more	  human	  rights	  and	  better	  environmental	  policies,	  but	  also	  dramatic	  reform	  of	  the	  state	  economic	  policies	  and	  laws.162	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Meanwhile,	  the	  church	  began	  weekly	  “prayers	  for	  peace”	  which	  quickly	  grew	  into	  more	  politically	  charged	  Montagsdemonstrationen.	  	  Protesters	  carried	  signs	  such	  as	  “Reisefreiheit	  statt	  Massenflucht”	  (Freedom	  of	  travel	  instead	  of	  mass	  fleeing)	  and	  chanted	  slogans	  of	  solidarity	  like	  “Wir	  sind	  das	  Volk!”	  (We	  are	  the	  people!),	  implying	  that,	  as	  the	  people	  of	  the	  GDR,	  they	  felt	  they	  were	  entitled	  to	  some	  say	  in	  their	  own	  government.163	  
With	  these	  swelling	  ranks	  of	  dissenters,	  the	  GDR	  regime	  was	  faced	  with	  the	  difficult	  decision	  of	  how	  to	  handle	  the	  protests.	  	  Despite	  the	  wishes	  of	  some	  in	  the	  government	  to	  be	  more	  conciliatory	  to	  the	  demonstrators—they	  were,	  after	  all,	  protesting	  peacefully—the	  first	  responses	  were	  more	  in	  tune	  with	  past	  repression.164	  	  However,	  on	  the	  night	  of	  Monday,	  October	  9,	  the	  demonstration	  following	  the	  church	  service	  at	  the	  Nikolaikirche	  in	  Leipzig	  was	  allowed	  to	  proceed	  undisturbed	  by	  police,	  who	  in	  some	  instances	  even	  stopped	  traffic	  for	  them.165	  	  This	  gave	  courage	  to	  many	  more	  protesters	  who	  joined	  the	  Montagsdemonstration	  the	  following	  week,	  bringing	  the	  total	  number	  of	  marchers	  to	  about	  100,000.166	  	  The	  week	  after	  that,	  their	  numbers	  swelled	  to	  over	  a	  quarter	  million.167	  	  The	  protests	  spread	  to	  other	  cities	  as	  well.	  	  In	  the	  somewhat	  small	  city	  of	  Schwerin,	  over	  eighty	  thousand	  marched	  for	  more	  democracy	  on	  October	  30.168	  	  On	  November	  4,	  between	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500,000	  and	  one	  million	  protesters	  took	  to	  the	  streets	  of	  East	  Berlin.169	  	  In	  Leipzig,	  half	  a	  million	  joined	  in	  on	  the	  November	  6	  Montagsdemonstration,	  almost	  the	  entire	  population	  of	  the	  city.170	  
These	  protests	  were	  having	  a	  notable	  effect	  on	  the	  SED	  regime.	  	  The	  travel	  ban	  to	  the	  West	  was	  lifted,	  though	  under	  strict	  guidelines,	  and	  with	  no	  guarantee	  of	  foreign	  visas	  or	  currencies.171	  	  A	  constitutional	  court	  was	  established,	  and	  there	  was	  discussion	  of	  democratic	  elections.172	  	  Many	  high-­‐ranking	  SED	  officials	  were	  fired,	  including	  the	  Minister	  of	  Education,	  many	  trade	  union	  leaders,	  and	  much	  of	  the	  Politburo.173	  	  Finally,	  on	  October	  18,	  Honecker	  was	  voted	  out	  of	  office	  in	  favor	  of	  Egon	  Krenz,	  though	  the	  media	  were	  told	  that	  he	  had	  resigned	  for	  health	  reasons.174	  
	   At	  a	  November	  9	  press	  conference,	  government	  spokesperson	  Günter	  Schabowski	  was	  answering	  questions	  about	  new	  freedom	  of	  travel	  laws.	  	  Schabowski	  fielded	  a	  question	  that	  asked	  when	  the	  ability	  to	  travel	  between	  East	  and	  West	  Berlin	  would	  begin,	  and	  erroneously	  answered	  “unverzüglich,”	  (immediately).175	  	  Schabowski’s	  error	  was	  heard	  by	  many	  across	  both	  sides	  of	  Berlin	  who	  massed	  in	  the	  streets	  and	  headed	  for	  the	  wall.176	  	  The	  East	  German	  border	  guards,	  wholly	  unprepared	  and	  unable	  to	  contain	  the	  throngs	  of	  people,	  simply	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opened	  the	  gates	  and	  stopped	  trying	  to	  stamp	  passports.177	  	  East	  Berliners	  and	  West	  Berliners	  celebrated	  together	  for	  the	  first	  time	  in	  years.178	  	  In	  the	  coming	  weeks	  and	  months,	  Berliners	  on	  both	  sides	  equipped	  themselves	  with	  sledgehammers	  and	  chisels	  and	  began	  to	  dismantle	  the	  wall.	  	  Symbolically,	  the	  barrier	  between	  East	  and	  West	  Germany	  was	  beginning	  to	  crumble.	  
	  
Conclusion	  to	  Chapter	  3	  
	   The	  German	  people	  rejoiced	  at	  their	  reunion	  with	  one	  another	  after	  over	  40	  years	  of	  separation.	  	  However,	  the	  mood	  of	  jubilation	  soon	  gave	  way	  to	  one	  of	  trepidation.	  	  Many	  wondered	  how	  the	  two	  Germanies	  would	  continue	  to	  conduct	  business	  with	  one	  another.	  	  The	  collapsing	  GDR	  government	  was	  mourned	  by	  few,	  indicating	  that	  most	  East	  Germans	  identified	  more	  as	  “German”	  than	  “DDR-­‐
Staatsbürger.”	  	  Though	  the	  GDR	  had	  attempted	  to	  create	  a	  new	  identity	  for	  its	  people,	  in	  the	  end,	  the	  ties	  to	  the	  German	  nation	  were	  too	  strong	  to	  be	  ignored.	  	  In	  the	  coming	  years,	  problems	  would	  arise	  from	  high	  unemployment	  and	  economic	  problems	  in	  the	  East.	  	  After	  the	  fall	  of	  the	  wall,	  though,	  none	  would	  question	  whether	  or	  not	  East	  Germans	  considered	  themselves	  German.	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Chapter	  4	  –	  The	  Berlin	  Republic:	  The	  German	  Nation	  From	  1990	  to	  Today	  
	  
The	  Beginnings	  of	  Reunification	  
	   With	  its	  policy	  of	  an	  open	  border,	  the	  GDR	  government	  had	  hoped	  that	  East	  Germans	  would	  visit	  West	  Germany	  and	  return	  with	  a	  new	  appreciation	  for	  the	  separate,	  socialist	  GDR.179	  	  While	  the	  majority	  of	  those	  who	  went	  west	  did	  return,	  over	  two	  thousand	  East	  Germans	  per	  day	  left	  permanently.180	  	  In	  the	  West,	  many	  former	  GDR	  citizens	  faced	  shifting	  attitudes	  from	  their	  Federal	  Republic	  brethren.	  	  While	  East	  Germans	  who	  had	  fled	  before	  1989	  were	  greeted	  with	  open	  arms,	  those	  who	  left	  in	  the	  later	  fall	  and	  winter	  of	  1989-­‐1990	  faced	  greater	  social	  resentment	  from	  West	  Germans,	  whose	  resourses	  like	  housing	  and	  social	  welfare	  were	  strained	  by	  the	  influx.181	  
	   In	  the	  East,	  however,	  many	  began	  to	  move	  away	  from	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  GDR,	  towards	  a	  more	  unified	  Germany.	  	  The	  banners,	  which	  had	  once	  read	  “Wir	  sind	  das	  
Volk!”	  were	  changed	  to	  “Wir	  sind	  ein	  Volk!”	  (We	  are	  one	  people)	  indicating	  that	  East	  Germans	  felt	  that	  they	  were	  no	  different	  from	  West	  Germans,	  they	  were	  one	  people,	  one	  nation.182	  	  The	  protests	  which	  had	  once	  called	  for	  democratization,	  instead	  began	  calling	  for	  reunification.183	  	  On	  November	  28,	  1989,	  Chancellor	  Kohl	  of	  the	  Federal	  Republic	  proposed	  a	  “Ten-­‐Point	  Plan	  for	  German	  Unity,”	  in	  which	  he	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promised	  to	  cooperate	  with	  the	  GDR	  in	  creating	  a	  German	  confederation	  which	  would	  link	  the	  two	  nations,	  on	  the	  condition	  that	  they	  allowed	  democratic	  elections.184	  	  This	  was	  initially	  seen	  as	  hurried	  by	  the	  GDR	  who	  felt	  that	  it	  would	  be	  compromised	  by	  the	  German	  free	  market	  economy.185	  	  However,	  as	  the	  functionality	  of	  the	  East	  German	  state	  continued	  to	  decline,	  Kohl’s	  proposal	  gained	  popularity.186	  	  As	  Fulbrook	  writes,	  “Threatened	  and	  burdened	  by	  the	  strains	  of	  the	  opening	  of	  the	  Wall,	  there	  was	  clearly	  no	  alternative	  to	  an	  equalization	  of	  living	  conditions	  and	  an	  integration	  of	  the	  economies	  of	  the	  two	  Germanies—and	  this	  inevitably	  implied	  political	  unification.”187	  	  Some	  German—and	  foreign—intellectuals	  were	  uncomfortable	  with	  the	  prospect	  of	  a	  unified	  Germany,	  fearing	  that	  the	  strengthened	  nation	  would	  “resume	  its	  hegemonic,	  aggressive,	  and	  exploitative	  behavior.”188	  	  The	  general	  feeling,	  however,	  was	  that	  through	  years	  of	  Western	  education	  and	  first-­‐hand	  experiences	  of	  the	  benefits	  of	  the	  free-­‐market	  democratic	  system,	  the	  German	  populace	  had	  reoriented	  itself	  politically	  and	  culturally	  to	  a	  degree	  that	  there	  was	  no	  threat	  of	  a	  relapse	  into	  Nazism.189	  	  
	   At	  a	  meeting	  between	  NATO	  and	  Warsaw	  Pact	  foreign	  ministers	  in	  Canada	  in	  February	  1990,	  it	  was	  decided	  that	  the	  two	  Germanies	  would	  be	  allowed	  to	  formulate	  their	  own	  plans	  regarding	  a	  unified	  state,	  which	  would	  then	  need	  to	  be	  approved	  by	  the	  original	  occupiers	  of	  Germany—the	  USSR,	  the	  USA,	  Britain,	  and	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France—and	  confirmed	  by	  the	  Conference	  on	  Security	  and	  Co-­‐operation	  in	  Europe	  (CSCE)	  to	  take	  effect.190	  	  The	  western	  powers	  wanted	  a	  unified	  German	  state	  as	  a	  member	  of	  NATO,	  though	  promised	  to	  concede	  that	  no	  NATO	  troops	  would	  be	  stationed	  in	  former	  East	  Germany.191	  	  A	  vote	  was	  scheduled	  for	  March	  18,	  which	  offered	  several	  different	  unification	  plans,	  the	  most	  popular	  of	  which	  was	  Kohl’s	  plan	  for	  rapid	  unification.192	  A	  temporarily	  problematic	  aspect	  of	  this	  plan	  was	  Kohl’s	  insistence	  upon	  leaving	  the	  border	  dispute	  with	  Poland	  to	  be	  decided	  at	  a	  later	  time	  by	  a	  unified	  German	  state,	  which	  many	  felt	  was	  somewhat	  imperialistic.193	  	  However,	  under	  pressure	  from	  both	  sides,	  Kohl	  acquiesced	  and	  acknowledged	  the	  current	  Oder-­‐Neisse	  border.194	  	  After	  some	  debate,	  and	  hesitancy	  on	  the	  part	  of	  Gorbachev	  and	  the	  Warsaw	  Pact	  nations,	  the	  plan	  was	  approved,	  and	  the	  unified	  Germany	  was	  allowed	  to	  join	  NATO.195	  	  	  
	   Kohl’s	  plan	  for	  rapid	  reunification	  won	  a	  decisive	  victory,	  though	  due	  to	  only	  receiving	  48	  percent	  of	  the	  vote,	  a	  coalition	  was	  needed	  to	  push	  through	  some	  of	  the	  constitutional	  changes.196	  	  The	  first	  of	  these	  was	  fixing	  the	  economy.	  	  The	  West	  German	  Deutschmark	  became	  the	  official	  currency	  of	  East	  Germany	  on	  July	  1,	  1990.197	  	  This	  made	  many	  East	  Germans	  uncomfortable	  due	  to	  their	  prices	  no	  longer	  being	  fixed	  low,	  but	  the	  prospect	  of	  being	  able	  to	  purchase	  western	  goods	  was	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appealing.198	  	  Additional	  problems	  arose	  when	  West	  Germans	  who	  had	  fled	  from	  East	  Germany	  many	  years	  ago	  sought	  to	  have	  their	  confiscated	  property	  returned	  to	  them.199	  	  Some	  industrial	  workers	  went	  on	  strike,	  demanding	  to	  be	  paid	  western	  wages,	  while	  pensioners	  worried	  their	  pensions	  would	  be	  rendered	  worthless.200	  	  
It	  was	  evident	  that	  a	  confederation	  between	  the	  two	  Germanies	  would	  be	  difficult	  to	  organize,	  and	  on	  a	  national	  scale,	  it	  was	  becoming	  abundantly	  clear	  that	  a	  single	  political	  administration	  was	  needed.201	  	  However	  the	  talks	  of	  a	  treaty	  to	  unify	  completely	  were	  not	  going	  well,	  as	  the	  East	  German	  economy	  was	  foundering,	  despite	  the	  currency	  reform,	  which	  had	  been	  intended	  to	  encourage	  West	  German	  investment.202	  	  Additionally,	  the	  distinction	  between	  Ossis	  (Easterners)	  and	  Wessis	  (Westerners)	  was	  coming	  to	  the	  forefront,	  as	  West	  Germans	  expressed	  their	  xenophobic	  displeasure	  with	  immigrants	  from	  the	  East.203	  
	   Despite	  all	  this,	  unification	  was	  scheduled	  to	  take	  place	  on	  October	  3,	  with	  the	  East	  Germans	  participating	  in	  their	  first	  Federal	  Republic	  general	  elections	  in	  December.	  	  The	  reunification	  was,	  on	  paper,	  simply	  the	  Federal	  Republic	  admitting	  5	  new	  Bundesländer,	  meaning	  that	  the	  nation	  that	  resulted	  was	  a	  continuation	  of	  the	  Federal	  Republic,	  not	  a	  successor	  of	  the	  GDR.204	  	  In	  the	  December	  elections,	  Kohl	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was	  voted	  in	  as	  the	  first	  chancellor	  of	  unified	  Germany,	  a	  reward	  for	  his	  efforts	  in	  the	  reunification	  process.205	  
The	  nature	  of	  the	  absorption	  of	  the	  former	  GDR	  meant	  that	  the	  balance	  of	  political	  power	  was	  upset	  by	  the	  large	  numbers	  of	  new	  voters	  who	  leaned	  further	  left	  than	  the	  dominant	  CDU.	  	  Accordingly,	  in	  1998,	  Kohl’s	  coalition	  was	  overthrown	  by	  a	  new	  SPD-­‐Green	  Party	  coalition	  with	  Gerhard	  Schröder	  at	  the	  helm.206	  	  This	  new	  government	  would	  be	  forced	  to	  reconcile	  the	  West	  German	  free	  market	  system	  with	  the	  East	  German	  system	  of	  social	  welfare,	  and	  ultimately	  its	  efforts	  would	  prove	  successful.207	  	  Along	  with	  political	  changes,	  East	  Germany	  also	  experienced	  physical	  and	  social	  change,	  where	  infrastructure,	  such	  as	  roads,	  telephone	  lines,	  and	  run-­‐down	  buildings	  were	  upgraded.208	  	  The	  bright-­‐colored	  buildings	  and	  new	  flashy	  lights	  of	  Western	  companies	  signaled	  that	  East	  Germany	  had	  become	  part	  of	  the	  West.	  
	   Now	  that	  Germany	  was	  whole	  once	  again,	  its	  people	  could	  identify	  with	  the	  single	  German	  nation.	  	  In	  the	  past	  this	  had	  meant	  militarism,	  racism,	  patriotism,	  and	  ultimately	  German	  exceptionalism.	  	  How	  would	  the	  new	  German	  nation	  compare?	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German	  Nationhood	  Today	  
	   Today,	  a	  sizeable	  majority	  of	  Germans	  living	  in	  the	  former	  GDR	  identify	  with	  the	  Federal	  Republic.209	  	  However,	  there	  are	  those	  who	  still	  feel	  excluded.	  	  One	  curious	  by-­‐product	  of	  the	  new	  unified	  Germany	  is	  the	  phenomenon	  of	  Ostalgie	  (a	  portmanteau	  of	  Ost	  and	  nostalgie,	  literally,	  east-­‐nostalgia).	  	  The	  reforms	  that	  swept	  the	  former	  GDR	  after	  reunification	  were	  very	  beneficial	  for	  younger	  East	  Germans,	  but	  the	  older	  generation	  was	  not	  afforded	  the	  same	  new	  opportunities,	  and	  felt	  somewhat	  alienated	  in	  the	  new,	  western	  country.210	  	  Some	  began	  to	  develop	  what	  Hanna	  Behrend	  calls	  “a	  specific	  East	  German	  identity	  that	  did	  not	  exist	  before	  the	  fall	  of	  the	  GDR.”211	  	  Ostalgie	  manifested	  itself	  in	  a	  few	  ways,	  the	  most	  common	  being	  the	  collection	  of	  GDR	  artifacts.	  	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  few	  who	  subscribe	  to	  this	  
Ostalgie	  actually	  wish	  for	  the	  return	  of	  the	  GDR.212	  	  Most	  just	  desire	  certain	  facets	  of	  the	  old	  regime,	  including	  the	  GDR	  healthcare	  systems	  and	  the	  family	  laws	  and	  labor	  legislation.213	  	  Thus	  while	  the	  majority	  of	  East	  Germans	  today	  identify	  with	  the	  Federal	  Republic,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  some	  of	  the	  older	  population	  of	  the	  former	  GDR	  continue	  to	  identify	  with	  it	  instead.214	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   The	  majority	  of	  Germans	  now	  identify	  with	  the	  Federal	  Republic,	  but	  what	  does	  that	  entail?	  	  German	  national	  feelings	  today	  are	  quite	  complex.	  	  Given	  the	  negative	  ideas	  associated	  with	  German	  nationalism	  and	  its	  past,	  Germans	  are	  generally	  anti-­‐nationalism,	  and	  shy	  away	  from	  patriotic	  expression.	  	  Germans	  see	  their	  country	  as	  a	  European	  Mittelmacht,	  but	  one	  which	  does	  not	  exert	  force	  on	  other	  states.215	  	  Indeed,	  many	  Germans	  identify	  as	  citizens	  of	  Europe	  as	  much	  as	  citizens	  of	  Germany.	  	  The	  loyalty	  to	  Europe	  is	  derived	  from	  the	  increasing	  cooperation	  of	  the	  European	  Union,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  Schengen	  Agreement.216	  Furthermore,	  as	  evidenced	  by	  recent	  economic	  troubles	  in	  Southern	  Europe,	  particularly	  Greece,	  Germany’s	  economic	  fate	  is	  tied	  to	  that	  of	  the	  Euro.217	  
Although	  important	  due	  to	  its	  geographic	  location	  in	  the	  center	  of	  Europe,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  is	  the	  most	  populous	  EU	  member	  state,	  Germany	  is	  primarily	  important	  to	  the	  European	  Union	  due	  to	  its	  economic	  power.	  	  During	  the	  recession	  of	  the	  late	  2000s,	  Germany’s	  economy	  was	  the	  eurozone’s	  primary	  driving	  force.218	  	  Germany	  does	  not	  take	  its	  position	  as	  the	  most	  powerful	  economy	  in	  Europe	  lightly.	  	  In	  fact,	  it	  is	  with	  its	  economic	  power	  that	  Germany	  prefers	  to	  assert	  its	  power.	  	  During	  the	  bailout	  of	  the	  Greek	  economy	  after	  the	  recession,	  Chancellor	  Angela	  Merkel	  played	  the	  primary	  role,	  refusing	  to	  accept	  bailout	  measures	  that	  would	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weaken	  Germany’s	  economy.219	  	  Furthermore,	  recently	  Germany	  and	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  EU	  have	  used	  economic	  sanctions	  against	  Russia	  to	  show	  disapproval	  of	  Russian	  President	  Putin’s	  invasion	  of	  Crimea	  and	  Eastern	  Ukraine.220	  	  Finally,	  although	  Germany’s	  economic	  power	  has	  taken	  the	  place	  of	  its	  former	  military	  might,	  the	  Bundeswehr	  is	  used	  occasionally	  in	  a	  limited	  capacity,	  such	  as	  the	  recent	  movement	  of	  500	  German	  troops	  to	  Lithuania	  for	  drills,	  to	  show	  Germany’s	  commitment	  to	  NATO.221	  	  For	  the	  most	  part,	  though,	  Germany	  shies	  away	  from	  using	  its	  military	  to	  make	  political	  statements,	  preferring	  to	  let	  its	  successful	  free	  market	  economy	  do	  the	  talking.	  	  But	  what	  about	  other	  aspects	  of	  Nazi	  German	  nationalism?	  
One	  of	  the	  most	  defining	  characteristics	  of	  the	  Nazi	  German	  ideology	  was	  fervent	  racism.	  	  The	  discrimination	  against,	  and	  ultimate	  extermination	  of,	  Jews,	  Slavs,	  and	  Roma	  peoples	  is	  perhaps	  the	  single	  most	  notorious	  crime	  of	  the	  Nazis.	  	  However	  contemporary	  Germany	  seems	  to	  have	  forgotten	  much	  of	  its	  racist	  past,	  even	  in	  the	  face	  of	  large-­‐scale	  immigration.	  	  Due	  to	  demographic	  issues	  (an	  aging	  populace	  and	  a	  low	  birth	  rate),	  Germany’s	  economy	  is	  partially	  dependent	  on	  immigrant	  laborers,	  many	  of	  who	  come	  from	  Southern	  and	  Eastern	  Europe	  and	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Turkey.222	  	  While	  there	  have	  been	  incidences	  of	  xenophobia	  and	  racism,	  such	  as	  riots	  in	  Hoyerswerda,	  Rostock,	  and	  Solingen,	  and	  more	  recently	  the	  Pegida	  rallies	  in	  Dresden,	  these	  are	  generally	  regarded	  in	  a	  negative	  light	  today.223	  	  Germans	  have	  made	  a	  concerted	  effort	  to	  show	  that	  they’ve	  distanced	  themselves	  from	  their	  Nazi	  past,	  and	  are	  beginning	  to	  embrace	  multiculturalism.224	  
Similarly,	  German	  patriotism,	  so	  rabid	  under	  the	  Nazis,	  has	  fallen	  into	  disuse.	  	  Into	  the	  late	  1990s,	  German	  flags	  were	  not	  seen	  in	  public	  except	  on	  official	  government	  buildings.225	  	  Children	  weren’t	  taught	  the	  words	  to	  the	  national	  anthem.226	  	  There	  has	  been	  a	  bit	  of	  rebound	  here,	  due	  in	  large	  part	  to	  Germany	  hosting	  the	  2006	  World	  Cup.227	  	  Although	  many	  fans	  abstain	  from	  singing	  the	  national	  anthem	  to	  this	  day,	  displaying	  the	  flag	  has	  become	  much	  less	  taboo,	  particularly	  during	  the	  World	  Cups	  in	  2006,	  2010,	  and	  2014.228	  	  While	  patriotism	  is	  far	  from	  ubiquitous	  in	  Germany,	  younger	  generations	  are	  becoming	  more	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comfortable	  with	  displaying	  national	  symbols	  in	  an	  athletic	  context,	  which	  is	  seen	  by	  many	  to	  be	  a	  healthier	  alternative	  to	  devoted	  “American-­‐style”	  patriotism.229	  
	  
Fourth	  Chapter	  Conclusion	  
The	  German	  nation	  today	  is	  a	  complicated	  mix	  of	  past	  experiences.	  	  The	  guilt	  of	  the	  Nazi	  era	  makes	  Germans	  uncomfortable	  about	  expressing	  patriotic	  feelings.	  	  The	  rift	  between	  East	  and	  West	  has	  not	  healed	  entirely.	  	  However	  the	  country	  is	  learning	  how	  to	  operate	  effectively	  in	  its	  new	  role	  as	  a	  European	  power.	  	  Germans	  identify	  with	  their	  nation’s	  strong	  free	  market	  economy	  and	  democratic	  government.	  	  Many	  of	  the	  hallmarks	  of	  the	  Nazi	  Germany,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  GDR,	  are	  carefully	  avoided	  in	  contemporary	  Germany.	  	  For	  this	  reason,	  one	  will	  not	  experience	  much	  militarism,	  racism,	  or	  patriotism	  in	  Germany	  today.	  	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  Germans	  refuse	  to	  let	  themselves	  forget	  about	  their	  Nazi	  past,	  shaping	  their	  actions	  both	  within	  their	  country	  and	  internationally.	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Conclusion	  
	   The	  German	  nation	  today	  is	  the	  product	  of	  seventy	  years	  of	  change.	  	  When	  the	  slate	  was	  wiped	  clean	  in	  1945,	  and	  Germans	  had	  to	  build	  a	  new	  nation,	  West	  Germans	  opted	  for	  free,	  democratic	  values.	  	  In	  the	  East,	  the	  Soviets	  prevented	  the	  development	  of	  such	  a	  nation.	  	  Though	  initially	  reluctant	  to	  acknowledge	  the	  socialist	  GDR,	  the	  Federal	  Republic	  ultimately	  opted	  to	  cooperate	  with	  East	  Germany,	  signifying	  that	  although	  the	  two	  nations	  had	  different	  political	  ideologies,	  both	  identified	  as	  German.	  	  In	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  collapse	  of	  the	  GDR,	  this	  pervasive	  German	  feeling	  proved	  too	  strong	  to	  ignore,	  and	  East	  Germans	  chose	  to	  become	  part	  of	  the	  Federal	  Republic,	  unifying	  all	  Germans	  under	  a	  single	  democracy.	  Germany’s	  willingness	  to	  use	  economic	  power	  and	  reluctance	  to	  use	  military	  power	  shows	  just	  how	  far	  the	  nation	  has	  come.	  	  Furthermore,	  a	  BBC	  poll	  found	  that	  Germany	  was	  the	  world’s	  most	  respected	  country,	  showing	  how	  well	  the	  nation	  has	  done	  at	  rehabilitating	  its	  Nazi	  image.230	  	  Although	  there	  are	  still	  problems	  with	  shedding	  the	  Nazi	  legacy,	  its	  people	  are	  careful	  to	  avoid	  being	  portrayed	  as	  harboring	  fascistic	  tendencies.	  	  Thus,	  Germany	  is	  no	  longer	  a	  militarily	  aggressive,	  imperialist,	  racist,	  or	  rabidly	  nationalist	  nation.	  Today,	  unified	  Germany	  is	  peaceful,	  democratic,	  and	  free.	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